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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the value-added role of industry specialist advisors in M&As. We find that 
industry specialist advisors generate higher returns for acquirers when deals are characterized by 
significant information asymmetry surrounding the target firms. Advisors that are able to provide 
value-enhancing M&A advice through their specialization effort are primarily those small- to 
medium-sized investment banks. This marks an important departure from prior studies, which 
primarily focus on advisors with the largest market share. Furthermore, acquirers benefit more 
from hiring advisors specializing in the target’s industry than in their own industry. While 
specialist advisors do not construct more synergistic deals, they help acquirers purchase targets at 
a lower price.  
JEL classification: G14, G24, G34 
Keywords: Industry Specialist Advisors; Acquirers, Abnormal Returns, Cross-industry Deal 
 
 
 
Acknowledgement:  
*Graham is from Stockholm Business School, Stockholm University (michael.graham@sbs.su.se). Walter 
is from the Discipline of Finance, University of Sydney (terry.walter@sydney.edu.au). Yawson is from 
School of Accounting and Finance, University of Adelaide (alfred.yawson@adelaide.edu.au). Zhang is 
from School of Accounting and Finance, University of Adelaide (hui.zhang@adelaide.edu.au). We thank 
Espen Eckbo, Andrey Golubov, Jarrad Harford, Nancy Huyghebaert, Scott Moeller, Sian Owen, Jesus 
Salas, Cameron Truong, Takeshi Yamada and seminar participants at the Australian National University, 
University of Adelaide, University of Melbourne, Stockholm University, Deakin University, La Trobe 
University, Monash University, University of South Australia, University of Technology Sydney, the 
2014 Multinational Finance Society Annual Conference, the 2014 Australasian Finance and Banking 
Conference and 2015 Behavioral Finance and Capital Market Conference for helpful comments. Finally, 
we thank the two anonymous referees for their insightful and constructive recommendations.  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of industry specialist advisors on M&A outcomes for 
acquirer clients. Existing research suggests that industry specialization fosters the development 
of core competencies and allows firms to better compete on quality rather than price dimensions. 
This effect is empirically documented in diverse fields such as auditing (Craswell, Francis and 
Taylor (1995); Balsam, Krishnan and Yang (2003); Dunn and Mayhew (2004)), security analysis 
(Clement (1999); Jacob, Lys and Neale (1999)) and private equity (Cressy, Munari and 
Malipiero (2007)). In M&As, anecdotal evidence suggests many banks such as Citi, UBS, and 
Centerview are engaging in a “narrow-scope” strategy, designed to focus resources on a narrow 
set of “core” industries.
1
 The resulting increased specialization can have significant implications 
for a bank’s ability to provide value-added services for their clients. Yet, we are unaware of any 
study that has empirically assessed this issue. Song, Wei and Zhou (2013) investigate the role of 
“boutique” advisors that specialize in serving the overall M&A market. Our paper is different 
from theirs in that it examines financial advisors’ specialization by industry.   
We define industry specialization as the degree to which an investment bank concentrates 
in a certain industry in which it has a comparative advantage (Argote (1999); Jacobides and 
Winter (2005); Hartfield, Liebeskind and Opler (1996); Chamberlin (1933), Friedman (1953), 
Lado, Boyd and Wright (1992)). Drawing on the established theories of industry specialization 
and organizational learning (see e.g., Dierickx and Cool (1989)), we posit that specialization 
enables advisors to focus resources and learning effort on a narrow range of industries, thereby 
accelerating the acquisition of industry-specific knowledge and skill. For example, compared 
with non-industry specialist advisors, specialist advisors may have developed sophisticated 
                                                          
1
 See “Bank specialization: new strategies, new risk?”, Deloitte, http://www2.deloitte.com/tr/en/pages/financial-
services/articles/bank-specialization-article.html, accessed at 27/1/2016. 
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valuation models in their focal industries. This can help acquiring firms better identify and 
evaluate the potential synergistic value of a deal. Focusing on a narrow scope may also enable an 
advisor to work closely with firms specific to an industry, establishing networks of connections 
necessary for extracting information important to an acquisition’s success. Thus, all else being 
equal, the employment of a specialist advisor should have a positive impact on acquisition 
performance measured by acquirer announcement abnormal returns.  
There are two fundamental factors complicating our empirical analysis. First, advisor 
industry specialization is obviously unobservable, though a variety of proxy measures exists in 
the literature. The method we use is the Additive Revealed Comparative Advantage (ARCA) 
index, adapted from the international trade and technological specialization literature (see 
Balassa (1965); Archibugi and Pianta (1994); Cressy, et al. (2007)). The index measures an 
investment bank’s degree of industry specialization as the concentration level of the bank’s 
overall M&A advisory activities in an industry, relative to that of an average investment bank.
2
 
We consider the ARCA index to be superior to traditional proxies such as the industry market-
share (IMS) approach. The IMS approach, for instance, measures a bank’s degree of 
specialization as its relative rank of market share in an industry. In contrast, the ARCA index 
measures the extent to which a bank focuses resources and business activities in a specific 
industry, and thus, better captures the spirit of industry specialization. In addition, the IMS 
approach is biased in favour of those large “bulge bracket” banks that are in fact less likely to 
                                                          
2
 Many of the large investment banks have industry groups, where groups of individual bankers specialize. It is thus 
possible that a deal is advised by specialist bankers even if the investment bank itself is not classified as a specialist 
in an industry. We are, however, unable to measure specialization at the individual banker level due to data 
limitations. Instead, we argue that specialization can be inferred at the institutional level where industry specialist 
bankers come together as a group in the institution to advise a deal. As the specialization level of the institution 
increases, we expect that more resources will be directed to that industry to hire and retain industry specialists. This 
should lead to a larger number of specialist bankers working in a particular industry. Consistent with this view, 
Stigler (1951) suggests that increases in the returns to individual specialization should lead to greater firm 
specialization, hence the two should move together. 
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specialize (Neal and Riley (2004)). The ARCA index instead takes into account both large and 
small investment banks. By comparing the concentration level of a bank’s portfolio to that of an 
average bank, the ARCA index ensures that the specialization level is directly comparable across 
both investment banks and industries. Cressy, et al. (2007) employ a similar methodogy to 
examine whether the relative industry specialization of private equity firms is valuable to their 
investees.   
Second, the use of a specialist advisor is almost certainly non-randomly determined. For 
example, a specialist advisor with greater concern over its own industry reputation may avoid 
participating in deals that it believes are ex ante value-destructive. Acquirers, on the other hand, 
may selectively choose the type of advisor based on their own situations. It is possible, for 
instance, that an acquirer may hire an advisor specializing in its own industry because the advisor 
has a better understanding of its business and thus can recommend transactions that better suit 
the acquirer’s needs. With this endogenous selection process, a simple Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression could produce inconsistent and biased estimates. We address this issue by 
employing a two-stage least square (2SLS) procedure throughout the analysis. 
Using a sample of U.S. M&A transactions announced over the period between 1985 and 
2010, we find that the use of a specialist advisor generates a positive and significant impact on 
acquirer abnormal returns after considering the endogenous choice of specialist advisors. The 
effect is, however, evident only in cross- (as opposed to same-) industry transactions. This 
finding suggests that a specialist advisor’s industry-specific assets are more valuable in deals 
where acquirers do not have detailed knowledge of the potential targets, and thus, rely primarily 
on the specialist advisor’s network and expertise to identify and evaluate the target candidates. 
The observed effect is economically significant. Holding other factors constant, the use of an 
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industry specialist increases acquirer announcement returns by 1.40%, relative to the use of a 
non-industry specialist advisor. This translates into U.S. $96.05 ($11.03) million incremental 
shareholder value for a mean (median) sized acquirer in our sample. 
To formally demonstrate the advantage of the ARCA index over the IMS approach, we 
conduct the following analyses. First, we use the IMS approach to redefine industry specialist 
advisors as those leading investment banks that have the top quartile of market share in each 
industry. Not surprisingly, this measure is highly correlated with advisor firm size and thus 
provides us with a contaminated measure of industry specialization. We then re-estimate our 
CAR regression on an “orthogonal” version of the IMS measure, designed to capture the 
specialization effect uncorrelated with the effect of advisor firm size. We find that after 
removing the advisor size effect, the “orthogonal” version of the IMS measure produces results 
consistent with our earlier estimation under the ARCA index. Finally, we examine directly 
whether the positive association between the ARCA index and acquirer CAR stems from those 
large, more reputable advisors rather than industry specialists. We find that the value creation in 
cross-industry deals is concentrated in investment banks in the second quartile of the size 
distribution, but not in others. This finding provides further evidence suggesting that the ARCA 
index captures those small- to medium-sized investment banks, which are more likely to enhance 
their M&A advisory service through specialization in specific industries.  
Next, we investigate whether the positive specialization-acquirer return association varies 
by an advisor’s industry focus (i.e., specializing in the acquirer’s versus the target’s industry). 
Using a continuous measure of the ARCA index, we find that the degree of an acquirer advisor’s 
specialization in the target industry significantly improves an acquirer’s announcement abnormal 
returns in cross-industry transactions. However, there is no significant association between the 
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degree of an acquirer advisor’s specialization in the acquirer’s industry and acquirer CAR. This 
finding is consistent with the idea that M&A advice is target-specific and that it is the specialist 
advisors’ knowledge of the target-industry, rather than the acquirer-industry, that is important to 
value creation. 
In further analysis, we explore whether advisor industry specialization continues to 
positively affect acquirer abnormal returns in other types of deals characterized by target 
information asymmetry, namely, deals in which the volatility of the target firm’s idiosyncratic 
return is relatively high, and deals in which the acquirer lacks recent acquisition experience in 
the target’s industry. We find evidence consistent with our conjectures. Specialist advisors help 
acquirers garner higher abnormal returns around the deal announcement, especially when the 
advisor has specialized knowledge of the target industry. These results reinforce the idea that 
industry specialists add more value to acquirers when they face greater asymmetric information 
surrounding the quality of target firms.  
Finally, we examine the channels through which a specialist advisor improves acquirer 
abnormal returns. We find that there is no significant association between advisor industry 
specialization and acquisition synergy, measured as combined announcement returns received by 
acquirer and target shareholders. However, takeover premiums are significantly lower for deals 
advised by specialist advisors than by non-industry specialists. Thus, the superior acquirer 
abnormal returns appear to mainly come from specialist advisors’ ability to accurately evaluate 
target firms operating in their domains.  
Our paper contributes to the M&A literature in two notable ways. First, prior research in 
this field mainly focuses on the role of top-tier investment banks in explaining variations in 
acquisition performance across acquirers (e.g., McLaughlin (1992); Servaes and Zenner (1996); 
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Rau (2000); Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003); Walter, Yawson and Yeung (2008), Golubov, 
Petmezas and Travlos (2012); Sibilkov and McConnell (2014)). We instead show that industry 
specialist advisors significantly enhance the shareholder value of acquiring firms through deal 
pricing. More importantly, the use of the ARCA index allows us to more accurately capture 
those advisors that are smaller and thus more likely to truly specialize in certain industries in 
practice. Our evidence that small- to medium-sized financial advisors are able to provide value-
enhancing advice to their acquirers differentiates our paper from prior studies focusing on top-
tier investment banks. Second, we contribute to the literature by showing that the value of 
industry specialist advisors is evident primarily in transactions where there is significant 
information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target, and it is the specialist advisor’s 
knowledge of the target-industry, rather than the acquirer-industry, that is valuable to acquirers. 
Our study also offers practical solutions for the choice of financial advisors in M&A 
transactions. For instance, given that investment banks commonly advertise their specialized 
industries online, our findings help acquiring firms make more informed decisions about what 
type of financial advisors to employ. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory. Section 
3 outlines the data and sample construction procedures. Section 4 provides empirical evidence on 
the relation between the use of a specialist advisor and acquisition performance, and Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Theory 
A commonly held belief is that industry specialization facilitates the development of 
specialized factors of production that are important for firms to compete on quality in their focal 
industries (Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988); Hartfield, et al. (1996); Solomon, Shields and 
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Whittington (1999); Jacob, et al. (1999); Moroney and Simnett (2009); Carson (2009)). In the 
investment banking industry, banks have more limited specialized factors of production than do 
other industrial firms because the difference in advisory skill sets across industries is not clear-
cut. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that investment banks create industry groups, a 
practice that amounts to a specialized factor of production. Thus, even if a large component of 
advisory skills is general and transferable across industries, the validity of the industry-specific, 
non-transferable part of the skill set cannot be disregarded. In particular, specialization enables 
investment banks to concentrate firm resources and learning effort on deals from a narrow range 
of industries, thus accelerating the acquisition of industry-specific knowledge and skills needed 
to attain superior performance (Bonner and Lewis (1990); Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart and 
Marangono (2003)). By focusing on deals from the same industry, for instance, a specialist 
advisor gains critical insights into the pertinent industry trends, regulation and other industry-
specific events that may significantly affect the financial performance of the merging firms. This 
knowledge is valuable since identifying synergistic opportunities associated with a potential 
target and assessing how likely these synergies will be realized in the future requires an advisor 
to have accurate information about the general trend of the market and how the industry of the 
target and the acquirer perform under different market conditions. Industry-level knowledge can 
also have a significant influence over the formation of valuation techniques used to price a firm’s 
assets. For example, the methodology used to evaluate a high-tech firm with a large proportion 
of intangible assets is clearly different from that used to value a manufacturing firm that has a 
large proportion of tangible assets. By incorporating the short-run and long-run industry 
dynamics into their valuation models, specialist advisors are able to help their acquirer clients 
better price a deal, which can translate into better acquirer returns.  
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Furthermore, a bank with narrower scope is able to work more closely with client firms 
operating in its focal industries. Centerview Partners, for example, contends that the key 
advantage of being a specialized investment bank is its ability to be “around our clients all the 
time, not just when they are doing transactions, and try to go as deeply as we can to understand 
their business”.
3
 Specialization allows an advisor to focus on a smaller client base and provide 
greater care and commitment to individual clients. By visiting the chief executives regularly and 
advising them on financial and strategic matters, a bank enhances its understanding of the firm’s 
business that can be directly used to improve its M&A advisory service. For instance, performing 
due diligence is cheaper and more effective for a bank specializing in the target’s industry, owing 
to its superior information about the target’s strengths and weaknesses obtained through past 
interactions. Similarly, advisors specializing in the acquirer’s industry can obtain deep 
knowledge of the acquiring firm’s business model, financing position, goals and challenges. This 
allows them to provide tailored expert advice in areas such as identifying cost-effective financing 
alternatives and locating targets that best meets the acquirer’s strategic objectives. Thus, we 
hypothesize that the choice of a specialist advisor has a positive effect on acquisition 
performance, all else being equal. 
We further conjecture that the value of specialist advisors varies by industry relatedness. 
On the one hand, the M&A advice is usually target-specific. Thus, an advisor’s knowledge of the 
target industry should matter more than its knowledge of the acquirer industry in determining the 
value creation potential for the acquiring firm. Following this line of reasoning, a specialist 
advisor’s M&A advice should be more valuable in cross-industry acquisitions, where the 
acquirer is likely to face greater difficulties in identifying and evaluating a target due to the 
                                                          
3
 See “Small proves beautiful at boutique banks”, Financial Times, 16 March 2014. 
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information asymmetry problem. On the other hand, it is possible that industry specialists add 
more value in same-industry deals where the advisor has in-depth knowledge of both merging 
firms. Consequently, it is a priori not clear which of these two scenarios would specialization 
have a more favourable effect on acquisition performance. We explore this issue in our empirical 
analysis. 
3. Data and Methodologies 
3.1. Sample Construction 
We begin by collecting data on U.S. M&A transactions from Thomson Financials 
Securities Data Collection Platinum (SDC) database.
4
 All successful and unsuccessful deals 
announced from 1985 to 2010 are considered if: (1) the acquirer is a U.S. public firm that has 
sufficient data from CRSP database to measure abnormal returns at the announcement date; (2) 
the payment method is disclosed by SDC; (3) the transaction value is greater than $1 million; (4) 
there is at least one investment bank advising the acquirer; and (5) the acquiring firm owns less 
than 10% of the initial stake and seeks to own more than 50% after the transaction (rumoured 
deals are excluded).
5
 Consistent with Golubov, et al. (2012), we further exclude deals classified 
as bankruptcy acquisitions, liquidations, leveraged buyouts, privatizations, repurchases, 
restructurings, reverse takeovers and going private transactions. Our final sample consists of 
8,266 deals.  
3.2. Measuring Industry Specialization  
                                                          
4
 While our sample covers the period between January 1985 and December 2010, the data are collected from 1980 
because the estimation of the industry specialization measure requires information for each advisor five years prior 
to the deal’s announcement.   
5
 We did not give consideration to whether the deal is completed or withdrawn because investment banks are 
expected to learn and accumulate industry-specific knowledge as long as they engage in deals announced in their 
focal industries. 
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We consider a wide array of statistical indicators that have been employed to proxy for 
industry specialization in the literature. The most commonly used proxy is perhaps the industry 
market share (IMS) approach, which classifies firms with the largest market share in an industry 
as industry specialists (e.g., Craswell, et al. (1995), Carson (2009)). The main problem with this 
approach is that it is highly correlated with firm size, and hence, biased towards larger 
investment banks (Neal and Riley (2004)). Consequently, a small local investment bank may 
advise clients exclusively in an industry, yet it would be rarely captured as an industry specialist 
bank under the IMS approach due to its relatively small size. In addition, the IMS approach may 
underspecify the number of specialist advisors in highly profitable industries, where vigorous 
competition can effectively prevent any individual banks from being a dominant advisor despite 
their effort to specialize (Neal and Riley (2004)). 
An alternative measure of industry specialization is the index of Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) developed by Balassa (1965). This measure has been widely applied in the 
international trade and technological specialization studies (e.g., Archibugi and Pianta (1994)) as 
well as the field of corporate finance (Cressy, et al. (2007)). The underlying rationale of the RCA 
index is that banks rationally choose to specialize in industries in which they have a comparative 
advantage (Chamberlin (1933); Friedman (1953)). Thus, although we cannot observe directly the 
industries in which each bank chooses to specialize, the choice of specialization should be 
“revealed” through their relative performance across industries. That is, a bank should perform 
better than its peers if it specializes and focuses firm resources on where it can better compete 
(Balassa (1965)). The key advantage of the RCA index over the IMS approach is that it measures 
a bank’s market share in a particular industry, while giving consideration to its relative size in 
the M&A market. This normalization technique allows the scaled or normalized levels of 
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industry specialization to be directly comparable across banks with different sizes. 
Mathematically, the RCA index is written as follows: 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑗
𝑖=(𝑋𝑗
𝑖 𝑋𝑗
𝐴⁄ ) (𝑋𝑖 𝑋𝐴⁄ );                                                                              (1𝑎)⁄  
or 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑗
𝑖=(𝑋𝑗
𝑖 𝑋𝑖⁄ ) (𝑋𝑗
𝐴 𝑋𝐴⁄ );                                                                              (1𝑏)⁄  
where: 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑗
𝑖 = the RCA value of 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 in 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗;  𝑋𝑗
𝑖 = the value of 
M&A deals advised by 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 in 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗; 𝑋𝑗
𝐴  = the total value of M&A deals 
advised by 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 in 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗; 𝑋
𝑖 = the value of M&A deals advised by 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 across all industries; 𝑋
𝐴 = the total value of M&A deals advised by 
𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 across all industries.  
Obviously, in Equation (1a), the numerator, 𝑋𝑗
𝑖 𝑋𝑗
𝐴⁄ , measures 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖’s 
market share in 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 . This is scaled by the bank’s relative size in the overall M&A market 
(𝑋𝑖 𝑋𝐴⁄ ). Thus, when a bank’s RCA value in an industry is above one, it is specializing in that it 
has more market share in that industry than its aggregate market share across all industries. 
Conversely, the bank is not specializing if its market share in that industry is less than its 
aggregate market share (i.e., with a below-one RCA). Equation (1b) is a simple transform of 
Equation (1a). The interpretation is similar except that Equation (1b) compares the portfolio 
share (as opposed to market share) of 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 in 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  (𝑋𝑗
𝑖 𝑋𝑖⁄ ) to the average 
investment bank’s portfolio share in that industry (𝑋𝑗
𝐴 𝑋𝐴⁄ ). An above-one RCA value indicates 
that 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 is specializing in 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  since its portfolio share of M&A advisory 
activities in that industry exceeds the average portfolio share of other investment banks. 
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To gain a better understanding of this measure, consider an investment bank that had 
advised on M&A deals worth a total of $1 billion across all industries (𝑋𝑖), of which $0.2 billion 
came from the high-tech industry (𝑋𝑗
𝑖). The aggregate value of M&A deals was $1 billion in the 
high-tech industry (𝑋𝑗
𝐴) and $10 billion across all industries (𝑋𝐴). In this example, the bank 
garners a market share of 20% (0.2/1) in the high-tech industry, which is two times larger than its 
total market share within the M&A market (10%=1/10). Thus, the RCA value of the bank in the 
high-tech industry is 2 (20%/10%). This suggest that given the firm resources it has, the bank is 
able to gain a higher market share in the high-tech industry through specialization.
6
 
Given the wide use of the RCA index in the literature, Hoen and Oostaerhaven (2006) 
investigate the statistical properties of the RCA index and find that it has two shortcomings. 
First, the RCA index has an unstable mean which could be greater than the theoretical value of 
one. Second, the distribution of the RCA index can be asymmetric and thus sensitive to industry 
classifications. They therefore suggest an alternative measure, the Additive RCA (ARCA), which 
is a simple variation of the RCA index. Formally, the ARCA index can be written as: 
𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑗
𝑖=(𝑋𝑗
𝑖 𝑋𝑖⁄ ) − (𝑋𝑗
𝐴 𝑋𝐴⁄ );                                                                  (2) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑗
𝑖 is the ARCA of 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 in 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 , and other notations are the same 
as defined in equation (1).  
The ARCA index differs from the RCA index in that it takes the difference, instead of 
quotient as shown in Equation (1b), between the portfolio share of 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 in 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  and that of an average investment bank. The main advantage of this additive method 
                                                          
6
 Alternatively, one can interpret the RCA value in terms of portfolio shares (Equation (1b)). In this case, the bank’s 
portfolio share in the high-tech industry is 20% (0.2/1), and the average portfolio share of all investment banks’ 
M&A advisory activities in this industry 10% (1/10). Thus, the bank’s RCA value is 2 (20%/10%), suggesting that 
the bank is specializing in the high-tech industry because it has a bigger portfolio share in the high-tech industry 
than an average investment bank. 
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is that it secures: (1) a stable mean of zero that is independent of the classification of industries; 
and (2) a symmetric distribution ranging from -1 to +1, which is demonstrated to be more stable 
than that of the RCA index (Hoen and Oostaerhaven (2006)). Theoretically, the relations 
between the ARCA index and industry specialization are shown as follows: 
If 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑗 > 0, 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 is specializing in  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 , meaning that 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 has a bigger portfolio share in 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  than an average investment bank; 
If 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 0, the portfolio share of  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  in 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 is identical to the 
average share in reference banks; and  
If 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑗 < 0, 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 is not specializing in 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 .    
 An investment bank can specialize in either the target’s industry or that of the acquirer. 
Thus, for each transaction, we construct two ARCA indices, one is measure based on the value 
of M&A transactions each acquirer’s advisor has advised in the target’s industry over the last 
five years before the deal announcement; the other is computed based on the value of M&A 
transactions advised by each acquirer advisor over the same period in the acquirer’s industry. 
Industries are classified according to the 3-digit SIC code. We employ a five-year rolling 
window to account for possible changes in an advisor’s industry focus over time. By definition, 
an investment bank that has advised on only one deal in a five-year window will be 
automatically classified as a specialist. Consequently, we remove all investment banks that have 
advised only one deal to avoid misclassification of industry specialist advisors. In the case where 
an acquirer hires multiple advisors, we follow prior studies such as Rau (2000) and assign the 
highest level of industry specialization among these advisors to the deal. When constructing the 
ARCA indices, we take into account the M&As among advisors which bring together the 
industry expertise of different investment banks, and hence, improve the performance of deals 
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advised by the newly merged banks. For instance, Merrill Lynch and Banc of America Securities 
LLC merged to form Bank of America Merrill Lynch in 2009. Thus, the ARCA value of the 
combined bank, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, is computed based on the value of M&A 
transactions advised by both Merrill Lynch and Banc of America Securities LLC in that industry 
over the last five years preceding the announcement date.
7
 Based on these ARCA values, we 
classify an acquirer advisor as an industry specialist if its ARCA value in the industry of the 
acquirer or that of the target is greater than zero and a non-specialist otherwise. 
Figures 1a and 1b depict the distribution of the acquirer advisors’ ARCA indices 
computed based on the value of M&A deals each advisor has advised in the target’s and the 
acquirer’s industry, respectively. Both distributions are positively skewed, suggesting that 
relatively few investment banks are highly specialized in certain industries, resulting in large 
ARCA values. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
3.3. Univariate Analysis 
In Table 1, we provide summary statistics for the main variables used in our empirical 
analysis, for the full sample and the industry specialist and non-industry specialist groups, 
respectively. The statistics in Panel A indicate that acquirers are more likely to select industry 
specialist advisors when they undertake more “difficult” deals. For example, compared to non-
industry specialists, industry specialist advisors are involved more in deals in which (1) the 
transaction size is absolutely large; (2) the bid is made for a public or private target; and (3) the 
acquisition is financed by stock. They are, however, less used in relatively small deals, tender 
offers, all-cash deals, foreign transactions, subsidiary acquisitions, cross-industry and hostile 
                                                          
7
 Because SDC occasionally uses different names for the same advising bank (e.g., deals advised by ‘Citi’ are 
regarded as different from those advised by “Citigroup”), we also combine advisor names in such cases into one 
when measuring the industry specialization levels. 
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deals. The differences in these deal characteristics between the two groups of advisors are all 
significant at the 1% level.  
Panel B, Table 1, presents the descriptive statistics for acquirer characteristics. Compared 
to acquirer clients of non-industry specialists, acquirers advised by industry specialist advisors 
experience a higher stock price run-up prior to the acquisition announcement (8.6% versus 
6.9%), and have a lower free cash flow ratio (4.9% versus 5.8%). However, there is no 
significant difference between these two groups in terms of acquirer size, Tobin’s Q, leverage 
and sigma.
8
  
The statistics for the key transaction outcomes are reported in Panel C, Table 1. The 
mean (median) acquirer cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over a three-day event window is 
0.3% (0%) in the overall sample. Acquirers advised by non-specialist advisors experience a 
mean (median) three-day CAR of 0.7% (0.2%), whereas acquirer clients of industry specialist 
advisors experience a lower mean (median) CAR of 0.0% (-0.3%). Nevertheless, acquirers 
appear to pay lower takeover premiums when they hire an industry specialist rather than a non-
industry specialist (43.30% versus 45.30% in mean and 35.28% versus 36.43% in median). The 
differences in mean and median premiums are, however, not statistically significant.  
Since the univariate analysis does not take into account confounding effects, we 
empirically investigate the relationship between advisor industry specialization and acquirer 
CAR in a multivariate OLS regression framework. We control for a set of deal and acquirer 
characteristics that have been shown in prior studies to be important determinants of acquirer 
CAR including acquirer size, preannouncement stock price run-up, sigma, free cash flow, 
                                                          
8
 Sigma measures a bidding firms’ idiosyncratic volatility and is defined as the standard deviation of the market-
adjusted daily returns of the acquirer’s stock over a 200-day window (-205, -6) (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 
2007). 
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leverage, Tobin’s Q, transaction size, relative size, industry relatedness, hostility of target 
management, number of competing bidders, tender offer, whether the deal involves a foreign 
target and the interactions between target ownership status and M&A currency (e.g., Asquith, 
Bruner and Mullins Jr (1983), Schwert (2000), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2007), Golubov, et al. 
(2012)). Golubov, et al. (2012) find that reputable advisors create value for acquirer clients in 
public acquisitions. We thus download financial advisor league tables from Thomson Financials 
SDC database and classify an advisor as reputable if the advisor is ranked among the top eight 
based on the transaction value it has advised, and non-reputable otherwise (top-8 advisor). Our 
top-8 specification is similar to Golubov, et al. (2012).
9
 To fully control for the effect of advisor 
reputation, we include the top-8 advisor variable as well as its interaction with the Public Target 
dummy variable in all multivariate regressions. The key variable of interest is the industry 
specialist dummy variable, which is equal to one if an acquirer hires a financial advisor whose 
ARCA value in the acquirer or the target industry is greater than zero; and zero otherwise. We 
estimate the acquirer CAR regression separately for the full sample and the cross- and same-
industry subsamples to test whether the importance of an industry specialist advisor varies 
according to industry relatedness. We classify a deal as a same- (cross-) industry transaction if 
the acquirer and target operate in the same (different) 3-digit SIC code.  
Table 2 reports the OLS regression results. All specifications control for industry and 
year fixed effects (whose coefficients are unreported for the sake of brevity). The t-statistics in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. We find that the industry 
specialist advisor variable is statistically insignificant throughout the table, suggesting that 
                                                          
9
 The following financial advisors are classified as the top-8 advisors: Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch (now Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch), Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Citi/Salomon Smith Barney, Credit Suisse/First Boston, 
Lehman Brothers (now Barclays Capital) and UBS. 
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advisor industry specialization has no impact on acquirer abnormal returns irrespective of deal 
type. As noted earlier, however, the reliability of OLS regression results hinges on whether an 
acquirer’s choice of advisors is exogenous. In practice, acquirers rarely select financial advisors 
randomly. Instead, as shown in Table 1, acquirers tend to use industry specialist advisors more 
often in more complex deals and in transactions where they have either a higher stock run-up or 
a lower free cash flow. Moreover, an acquirer’s choice of financial advisors and acquirer CAR 
could be simultaneously affected by certain unobservable factors. Compared to non-industry 
specialists, for instance, industry specialist advisors may have better ability to distinguish “good” 
from “bad” deals occurring within their specialized industries. This may allow them to cherry-
pick deals that are ex ante value-creating. It could also be the case that acquirers consider 
industry specialist advisors only when the deals pose a significant value challenge. Since we 
cannot fully control for these unobservable factors in an OLS regression model, the coefficient 
estimates we obtain from Table 2 could be biased and inconsistent (MacKay and Phillips (2005), 
Hochberg and Lindsey (2010)). To alleviate these endogeneity concerns and properly analyze the 
relation between advisor industry specialization and acquisition performance, we implement a 
two-stage least square (2SLS) regression approach, discussed as follows.  
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 here] 
3.4. Econometric Model 
We consider a model with the following form: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 +  𝑖,                                                         (3) 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝑍𝑖𝛿 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 +  𝜇𝑖;                                                         (4) 
Equation (3) is the structural equation where 𝑦𝑖 represents an acquisition outcome 
measured by acquirer abnormal return, takeover premium or total synergy; 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 
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is the variable of interest which indicates whether or not an acquiring firm employs an industry 
specialist advisor; 𝑋𝑖 denotes a set of exogenous variables that capture various advisor-, deal- 
and acquirer-specific characteristics; and 𝑖 is the error term. Equation (4) is the reduced form 
equation for the endogenous regressor, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖. 𝑍𝑖 denotes a vector of exogenous 
instruments (introduced below); β0 is the intercept; and 𝜇𝑖 is the disturbance term. The 2SLS 
approach has been widely employed in the fild of corporate finance to address endogeneity (e.g., 
Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-eGonzalez and Wolfenzon (2007), Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu 
(2010)). 
 To identify the model, we need instrumental variables (IVs) that are correlated with the 
choice of an industry specialist advisor (i.e., relevance criterion), but unrelated to acquisition 
performance other than operating indirectly through their impacts on the acquirer’s choice of a 
specialist advisor for the current deal if any (i.e., exclusion criterion). Our choice of instruments 
is motivated by social interaction theory which posits that a firm’s behavior is affected by other 
firms in its neighborhood (e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996)). Specifically, 
acquiring firms in the same industry are endowed with the same information network, which can 
influence how they perceive the value of an industry specialist advisor through information 
sharing (Engelberg, Gao and Parsons (2012), Engelberg, Ozoguz and Wang (2013)). In a similar 
vein, geographic proximity increases interaction between many, albeit dissimilar, acquiring 
firms, which may lead to collective behavior of selecting a certain type of financial advisors in 
some geographic regions (Glaeser, et al. (1996), Kedia and Rajgopal (2009), Hochberg and 
Lindsey (2010)). Thus, following this intuition, we construct geography- and industry-based 
proximity variables, designed to capture the influence of local peers over an acquiring firm’s 
choice of a financial advisor. The first variable is the “average use of industry specialists by 
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geographic peers”, computed as the number of industry specialists hired by an acquiring firm’s 
peers over the last one year prior to the announcement date, scaled by the total number of 
advisors employed by the same peers over the same period. Geographic peers are the acquiring 
firms located in the same Federal State as the acquirer. The second variable is the “average use 
of industry specialists by industry peers”, defined in a similar way except that an acquiring firm’s 
local peers are classified as those acquirers located in the industry with the same 3-digit SIC code 
as the acquirer. If an acquirer is more likely to watch and follow the actions of its neighboring 
acquiring firms, we expect it to be more likely to select an industry specialist advisor if a large 
proportion of its local peers had employed an industry specialist advisor in the past. Meanwhile, 
there is no obvious reason to believe that the average prior use of specialist advisors by peers 
would directly affect the performance of the acquirer’s current deal. 
With the use of two instrumental variables, we can formally test our instruments for 
statistical exogeneity using the Hansen-J test (Hochberg and Lindsey (2010), Fletcher and Lehrer 
(2011)). This test formally tests the joint null hypothesis that: (1) the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the structural error term, 𝑖 ; and (2) the model is correctly specified (i.e., the 
instruments are correctly excluded from the structural equation). To test whether our instruments 
are also “strongly” correlated with the included endogenous regressor, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖, we 
employ the Stock and Yogo (2002) test (Staiger and Stock (1997)). Under the null hypothesis 
that the set of instruments is jointly weak (even if the model is identified), the Stock and Yogo 
(2002) test provides critical values that vary according to factors such as the size of the 
instrument set and the number of endogenous variables (Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002)). A set 
of instruments is considered “strong” if the test statistic exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2002) 
critical value for a maximal size bias that one is willing to tolerate with the estimator (e.g., the 
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worst-case limiting rejection rate for a nominal 5% Wald test of a null that the coefficients of the 
instruments are jointly equal to zero). These diagnostic test statistics are reported in the next 
section. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Main Results 
Table 3 re-estimates the relation between the use of industry specialist advisors and 
acquirer abnormal returns, using the 2SLS regression approach. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
results for the full sample, and the results for the subsample of cross- and same-industry deals are 
presented in Columns (3) and (4), and Columns (5) and (6), respectively. For each system, the 
“first-stage” model is a linear probability model which predicts the probability of an acquiring 
firm hiring an industry specialist advisor, using “average use of industry specialists by 
geographic peers” and “average use of industry specialists by industry peers” as IVs and a 
vector of control variables from the structural equation of acquirer CAR. The “second-stage” 
model predicts the acquirer three-day CAR, with control variables the same as those used in 
Table 2.
10
 All models include year and industry fixed effects but these are not reported. The z-
scores in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the acquiring firm 
level.  
Columns (1), (3) and (5), Table 3, report the first-stage regression results obtained from 
the estimation of the combined system of equations (3) and (4) for the full sample as well as the 
subsample of cross- and same-industry deals. Consistent with our expectation, the instrumental 
variables, “average use of industry specialists by geographic peers” and “average use of industry 
specialists by industry peers”, are positive and significant at the 1% level in all the estimated 
                                                          
10
 The results remain unchanged when we instead compute acquirer CAR based on an equally-weighted market 
index or using alternative event windows such as (-2, +2), (-5, +5), and (0, +250). 
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regressions. Thus, an acquiring firm is indeed more likely to hire an industry specialist advisor 
when there is a higher percentage of its local peers using specialist advisors in the past. The 
results from the full sample analysis further indicate that acquiring firms are more likely to 
employ a specialist advisor when they have larger market capitalization, undertake absolutely 
smaller but relatively larger transactions, and when they make stock-financed acquisitions of 
private target firms (Column (1)). However, the probability of hiring an industry specialist 
advisor is significantly lower in acquisitions of foreign targets. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that acquiring firms making foreign acquisitions appreciate more the global presence 
of a large, diversified investment bank rather than the deep, yet typically regional-specific, 
knowledge base owned by an industry specialist. Other variables have either no or a marginally 
significant impact on the probability of using a specialist advisor. The subsample analyses 
produce similar results (Columns (3) and (5)).  
At the bottom of Table 3, we report the regression diagnostics. For each system the p-
value of Hansen-J test statistics is greater than 10%. Thus, there is no evidence that our set of 
instruments violates the over-identifying restriction. To test instrument strength, we report the F-
statistics for the joint significance of our instruments. We find that in all specifications, the F-test 
statistics are well above the Stock-Yogo critical value of 19.93, suggesting that our instruments 
are collectively strong.  
Columns (2), (4) and (6), Table 3, report the results from the second-stage regression of 
acquirer three-day CAR.
11
 We find that the industry specialist variable (instrumented) is positive 
and statistically insignificant in the full sample (column (2)). Moving to the subsamples, 
however, we find a positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) effect of the use of an 
                                                          
11
 The results remain unchanged when we instead compute acquirer CAR based on an equally-weighted market 
index or using alternative event windows such as (-2, +2), (-5, +5), and (0, +250). 
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industry specialist on acquirer CAR in cross-industry transactions (column (4)), but not in same-
industry deals (column (5)). The effect is economically significant. All else being equal, the use 
of an industry specialist advisor is associated with 1.40% increase in acquirer announcement 
returns, relative to the use of a non-industry specialist advisor. This translates into U.S. $96.05 
($11.03) million incremental shareholder value for a mean- (median-) sized acquirer in our 
sample. Overall, these findings are consistent with industry specialization enabling an advisor to 
provide value-enhancing M&A advice to a firm that acquires a target operating in a different 
industry, and hence, faces greater difficulties in evaluating the target due to information 
asymmetry. 
With regard to control variables, we find that the top-8 advisor variable is positive and 
significant in both the full sample and the cross-industry subsample. In contrast to Golubov, et 
al. (2012), however, the interaction term between the top-8 advisor and the Public Target 
variable is negative, and either marginally significant or insignificant throughout the Table.
12
 The 
deal and acquring firm level control variables generally produce coefficient estimates consistent 
with prior literature. For example, in line with Moeller et al. (2004) and (2007), we find that 
acquirers with larger size and greater free cash flows generally experience lower announcement 
abnormal returns in the full sample and cross-industry subsample. The coefficients on acquirer 
Tobin’s Q is negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level) in cross-industry acquisitions. 
Both an acquirer’s leverage ratio and stock price volatility (sigma) positively and significantly 
(at the 5% level) affect acquirer abnormal returns in the full sample. On average, relatively larger 
                                                          
12
 Possible reasons for this discrepancy include: (1) our sample involves M&A transactions announced for a longer 
period of time (between 1985-2010) when compared to the sample used in Golubov, et al. (2012) (between 1996-
2009); (2) we consider both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, whereas Golubov, et al. (2012) focus on 
domestic transactions only; and (3) our top-8 specification includes UBS (as opposed to Lazard in Golubov, et al. 
(2012)) as one of the top-8 advisors, according to the financial advisor league tables downloaded from the Thomson 
Financials SDC database for the period 1985-2010. 
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deals are associated with higher acquirer abnormal returns, consistent with Asquith, et al. (1983), 
Schwert (2000), Fuller, et al. (2002), Moeller, et al. (2004), Moeller, et al. (2007), Golubov, et 
al. (2012). Finally, among the six acquisition types based on target listing status and M&A 
currency, public acquisitions financed by stock are associated with the lowest acquirer 
announcement returns, confirming the evidence documented by Masulis et al. (2007). Other 
control variables generate either no or a marginally significant effect on acquirer abnormal 
returns. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2. Industry Market Share Approach versus the ARCA Index  
In Section 3.2., we have argued that the ARCA index is superior to the industry market 
share (IMS) approach which is highly correlated with advisor firm size. The intuition behind this 
argument is that firm size could be a reflection of various competitive advantages, some of which 
may not directly relate to a bank’s specialization effort. For example, both practitioners and 
researchers often view larger investment banks as more reputable financial advisors (e.g., Rau 
(2000), Kale, et al. (2003), Golubov, et al. (2012)). The overall reputation helps an advisor to 
win more market share in an industry, but it may not be a specialist in a “true” sense if it knows 
only the trends and financial statistics from the top five major public firms but not others 
operating in the industry.
13
 A high market share achieved by a larger advisor in an industry could 
also be a result of its greater capacity to accept M&A mandates than other smaller, more 
resource-constrained investment banks. Thus, the IMS approach does not give us a “clean” 
measure of advisor industry specialization. The ARCA index, on the other hand, removes firm 
                                                          
13
 The comment was made by Douglas M. Schmidt, who worked at larger banks such as the Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, and is currently the CEO and Managing Director of a specialty M&A bank, Chessiecap, Inc. 
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size effect through the technique of normalization (i.e., by scaling an advisor’s industry market 
share by its total size).  
To demonstrate the superiority of the ARCA index formally, we re-estimate our CAR 
regression on the choice of industry specialists using the IMS approach. Under the IMS 
approach, specialist advisors are simply those leading investment banking firms that have the 
largest market share in an industry (e.g., Craswell, et al. (1995), Carson (2009)). Accordingly, 
for each transaction, we measure an acquirer advisor’s specialization level in the target’s 
(acquirer’s) industry as the value of transactions the advisor has advised in the target’s 
(acquirer’s) industry over the last five years, scaled by the value of all acquisitions in the same 
industry over the same period. An acquirer advisor is then classified as an industry specialist if it 
is within the top quartile of market share in the target or acquirer industry; and a non-specialist 
otherwise (industry specialist – IMS). 
In Panel A, Table 4, we investigate the Pairwise correlation between advisor firm size, as 
proxied by the top-8 advisor variable; and the two alternative industry specialization measures, 
namely, industry specialist advisors defined by the IMS approach (industry specialist – IMS), 
and specialist advisors measured by the ARCA index (industry specialist – ARCA). We find that 
these two industry specialization measures are highly correlated at 50.25%. However, the 
industry specialist – IMS variable is positively and highly correlated with the top-8 advisor 
variable (0.48), whereas the correlation between top-8 advisor and industry specialist-ARCA is 
very low (0.04). Thus, although the IMS approach captures a considerable proportion of an 
advisor’s specialization effect, it is indeed contaminated by advisor size effect which could be 
driven by certain advantages of a larger advisor (e.g., capacity and reputation) unrelated to the 
advisor’s specialization effort.  
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To disentangle the specialization effect from the firm size effect, we follow El-Khatib, 
Fogel and Jandik (2015) and create “orthogonal” versions of the industry specialist – IMS 
variable and the top-8 advisor variable, the proxy for advisor firm’s size.
14
 Specifically, we 
orthogonalize these two variables into a set of mutually orthogonal variables such that the effect 
of the preceding variable (in this paper, industry specialist – IMS) is removed from the 
subsequent variable (top-8 advisor). This procedure allows us to capture the unique impact of 
industry specialization, uncorrelated with the size effect of advisors, while keeping both 
variables in the same regression model. Panel B, Table 4, reports the 2SLS regression results of 
acquirer CAR for the full sample and the subsamples of cross- and same-industry deals, using the 
industry specialists classified by the IMS approach. The IVs and control variables are the same 
as before.
15
 In all regressions, the year and industry fixed effects are controlled for but not 
reported, and the z-scores in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer 
clustering. 
Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the first-stage regression results. We find that our 
instruments are both positive and highly significant in each of these three columns. The F-
statistics reported at the bottom of Panel B, Table 4, are again well above the Stock-Yogo 
threshold of 19.93, indicating that weak identification is not a concern. The Hansen-J test 
statistics are statistically insignificant throughout the table, thus failing to reject the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments.  
In columns (2), (4) and (6), we present the second-stage regression results, with the 
choice of industry specialist advisor endogenized. Consistent with our previous findings, the 
                                                          
14
 Orthogonalization is achieved via the modified Gram–Schmidt process (Golub and Van Loan (1996)).  
15
 The original IVs, which measure the percentage of local peers hiring specialist advisors defined according to the 
ARCA index, should better predict the acquirer’s choice of advisors since the IMS approach captures both advisor 
specialization and size effects. Using alternative IVs computed based on the IMS approach produces similar results, 
although the effect is generally weaker.  
27 
 
orthogonally transformed industry specialist – IMS variable is positive but only marginally 
significant in the full sample and insignificant the same-industry subsample (columns (2) and 
(6)). For cross-industry transactions, however, it is positive and highly significant (at the 1% 
level) (column (4)). The coefficient estimate of the industry specialist – IMS variable is 0.0136 in 
column (4), which is close to the estimate reported in column (4) of Table 3 (0.0140). Thus, after 
removing firm size effects, the IMS approach produces an estimate of specialization effect that is 
directly comparable to the effect estimated based on the ARCA index. The control variables 
exhibit effects on acquirer CAR similar to those reported in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
To provide additional evidence that the ARCA index does not capture advisor size or 
reputation effect, we examine whether the positive association between acquirer CAR and 
advisor industry specialization, measured by the ARCA index, is concentrated in large 
investment banking firms. To do so, we rank investment banks into size quartiles based on the 
value of M&A transactions each bank has advised over the last year prior to the announcement 
date (Rau (2000), Bao and Edmans (2011)). Next we regress acquirer CAR on the industry 
specialist dummy variable for each size quartile. This analysis allows us to compare the average 
acquirer CAR associated with industry specialist and non-industry specialist advisors within the 
same size categories, and hence sheds light on whether the value is created by industry specialist 
advisors or just those large, more reputable advisors. For brevity, we report only the coefficients 
on the industry specialist dummy variable, and the analysis is restricted to the subsample of 
cross-industry acquisitions where we find advisor industry specialization is valuable to an 
acquirer. 
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Table 5 summarizes the 2SLS regression results. We find no significant difference in 
acquirer CAR between industry specialist and non-industry specialist advisors for the first, third 
and fourth quartiles. However, those advisors in the second quartile of the size distribution are 
able to produce 3.21% higher acquirer abnormal returns through their specialization effort. The 
effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that a bulk of value 
enhancement in cross-industry deals, as shown in Table 3, comes from small- to medium-sized 
industry specialist advisors rather than large advisors. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.3. Continuous Measure of Advisor Industry Specialization 
So far, we have shown a positive relation between acquirer CAR and the industry 
specialist dummy variable. A potential concern for the use of this general dummy variable is that 
any variation within the category is ignored. For example, advisors with positive ARCA values 
are all considered as industry specialists, although the ARCA could range from one to a value 
very close to zero. We address this issue by employing a continuous measure, which allows us to 
more precisely estimate the percentage change in acquirer CAR for a given change in advisor 
industry specialization.  
As noted earlier, we have constructed two ARCA indices for each M&A transaction. The 
first ARCA index is computed based on the total value of M&A transactions advised by an 
acquirer advisor in the target’s industry over the last five years prior to deal announcement 
(specialization level in target industry). The second ARCA index is measured based on the total 
value of M&A transactions advised by the advisor in the acquirer’s industry over the same 
period (specialization level in acquirer industry). As these two variables are collinear,
16
 we 
regress acquirer CAR on these two variables separately. For stronger identification of the model, 
                                                          
16
 The correlation between these two ARCA values is 0.68. 
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we include the industry- and geographic-based instruments which compute the average use of 
advisors specializing in the target’s industry or in the acquirer’s own industry by an acquirer’s 
peers over the last one year prior to date announcement.  
Columns (1) through (6) of Table 6, report the results from the 2SLS regressions of 
acquirer CAR on these two continuous measures of advisor industry specialization. We control 
for the same set of variables as in earlier tables, with the first-stage regression results omitted 
here for the sake of brevity. Again, the z-scores are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer 
clustering. Columns (1) through (3) estimate the impact of an acquirer advisor’s specialization 
level in the target’s industry on acquirer CAR for the full sample and the cross- and same-
industry acquisition subsamples. Columns (4) through (6) repeat the analysis using the acquirer 
advisor’s specialization level in the acquirer’s industry. In each column, the Hansen-J test 
statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments. The F-statistics exceed the Stock-
Yogo threshold of 19.93 in all specifications except in the subsample analysis of same-industry 
acquisitions.  
The main results, reported in Table 6, indicate that an acquirer advisor’s specialization 
effort in the acquirer’s industry has no significant impact on acquirer CAR (columns (4) through 
(6)). However, an advisor’s specialization level in the target’s industry yields a positive and 
significant (at the 10% and the 5% level, respectively) impact on acquirer returns in both full 
sample and cross-industry acquisitions (columns (1) and (2)). This suggests that advisor industry 
focus matters. A specialist advisor adds more value to an acquirer when it has specialized 
knowledge about the target firm’s industry.  
To identify the effect of the most important “common element” shared by these two 
specialization measures, we perform a principal component analysis (e.g., Hotelling (1933), El-
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Khatib, et al. (2015)). The first component (PC1) is a linear combination of the two 
specialization variables, which captures 83.94% of overall variance. Columns (7) through (9), 
Table 6, report the 2SLS regression results. Again, the regression diagnostics provide support for 
our choice of instruments. Consistent with our previous findings, we find that the first principal 
component of our continuous measures of advisor industry specialization significantly and 
positively affects acquirer abnormal returns in cross-industry acquisitions only. Other 
determinants of acquirer CAR generally have the expected signs.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.4. Alternative Measure of Target Information Asymmetry 
The preceding analysis has indicated that acquiring firms experience higher 
announcement abnormal returns when they employ specialist advisors in cross-industry 
acquisitions. This finding is most consistent with advisor industry specialization being more 
important in acquisitions where acquirers face greater information asymmetry about the target 
firms, and hence, more challenges to properly value the targets. In this subsection, we provide 
further evidence on this issue by assessing whether advisor industry specialization continues to 
positively affect acquirer abnormal returns when alternative measures of target information 
asymmetry are used. We consider two settings. First, we follow Officer, Poulsen and 
Stegemoller (2009) and employ target idiosyncratic return volatility as an alternative proxy for 
target information asymmetry. Intuitively, advisor industry specialization is more (less) valuable 
to acquiring firms when a target has higher (lower) idiosyncratic return volatility, and thus, poses 
greater (smaller) valuation challenges to an acquirer. We measure target idiosyncratic return 
volatility as the standard deviation of the target firm's market-adjusted daily returns over the 
period (-205, -6) prior to the announcement.  
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Panel A of Table 7 conducts the CAR analysis for the subsamples split based on whether 
the target firm has above- or below-mean idiosyncratic volatility. The first-stage results are 
omitted for brevity. We employ all three specialization measures, namely, the industry specialist 
dummy variable, and the two continuous measures of acquirer advisor’s specialization in the 
target’s industry and in the acquirer’s industry. Since the sample here includes only public 
acquisitions for which the data on target share price are available, we exclude the interaction 
term between the top-8 advisor and public target variables from our model. The six interaction 
terms between target listing status and payment method are replaced by the payment include 
stock variable. The IVs and other control variables are the same as those shown in Table 3. 
Columns (1) through (3) present the results from the second-stage regression of acquirer CAR on 
each of our specialization measures for the subsample of target firms with above-mean 
idiosyncratic return volatility. Columns (4) through (6) repeat the analysis for the subsample of 
target firms with below-mean idiosyncratic return volatility. In all columns, the Hensen-J test 
statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments. The F-test statistics suggest that 
our instrumentation is collectively strong in all but the specifications where continuous measures 
of advisor industry specialization are used in the subsample of target firms with below-mean 
return volatility (columns (5) and (6)).   
Consistent with our conjecture, the results indicate a positive and significant (at the 5% 
level) association between an acquirer advisor’s specialization level in the target’s industry and 
acquirer CAR when target firms have above-mean idiosyncratic return volatility (column (2)). 
We find similarly positive estimates for the general industry specialist dummy variable and the 
continuous measure of acquirer advisor’s specialization level in the acquirer’s industry, but both 
estimates are statistically insignificant (columns (1) and (3)). On the other hand, none of our 
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specialization measures significantly affects acquirer announcement returns in the acquisitions of 
firms with below-mean idiosyncratic return volatility.  
Second, we investigate whether advisor industry specialization is more helpful for 
acquiring firms with no recent acquisition experience in the target’s industry. Past acquisitions of 
other firms in the target’s industry allow an acquirer to develop knowledge of that industry, 
which is directly transferrable and applicable to the assessment of the target in the current deal. 
This reduces information asymmetry, and hence, the value of the acquirer advisor’s industry 
expertise. Thus, we expect advisor industry specialization to be more valuable to acquirers with 
no prior M&A experience in the target’s industry, in which case the information asymmetry 
problem is more severe. We measure an acquirer’s past acquisition experience as the number of 
acquisitions that it has undertaken in the same 3-digit SIC industry as the current target over the 
last three years before deal announcement.
17
  
Panel B of Table 7 regresses acquirer CAR on our three industry measures for the 
subsamples split based on whether the acquiring firm has made any acquisition in the target’s 
industry in the past. All estimates are taken from the 2SLS regression model, with the first-stage 
regression results suppressed for brevity. Again, the IVs and control variables are the same as 
those shown in Table 3. The diagnostics for our IV models are similar to those reported in Panel 
A of Table 7. Columns (1) through (3) report the second-stage results for the subsample of 
acquiring firms with no past acquisition experience in the target’s industry. Consistent with our 
expectation, we find evidence of a significant positive effect of an acquirer advisor’s 
specialization in the target’s industry on the acquirer CAR when the acquirer has no recent 
experience in acquiring firms in the target’s industry (columns (1) & (2)). In contrast, there is no 
                                                          
17
 Our results continue to hold when an acquirer’s past acquisition experience is measured over an alternative rolling 
window such as 1 year and 5 years. 
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significant association between our industry specialization measures and acquirer abnormal 
returns for the subsample of acquirers with recent acquisition experience in the target’s industry 
(columns (4) through (6)). Overall, these results add to the evidence suggesting that an acquirer 
benefits most from hiring a specialist advisor with detailed knowledge about the target’s industry 
when there is significant information asymmetry surrounding the target. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.5. Additional Robustness Checks 
We conduct a number of additional tests to verify the validity of our findings. First, 
Figure 1 indicates that the ARCA index is highly concentrated around zero. Thus, a potential 
concern is that the difference in the level of advisor industry specialization could be actually very 
small when a zero ARCA value is used as a cut-off point.
 18
 For instance, compared to an advisor 
with a negative ARCA value of 0.05 (i.e., a non-industry specialist), an advisor with a positive 
ARCA value of 0.05 is considered as an industry specialist, although the difference in the level 
of industry specialization between these two advisors is only 0.1. We have alleviated this 
concern by regressing acquirer CAR on the continuous measure of the ARCA index in Table 6. 
As an additional robustness check, we repeat our analysis on the industry specialist dummy 
variable defined based on the top and bottom third of the ARCA values only. This procedure 
allows us to focus on advisors at the extremes that arguably possess the largest differences in 
their specialization levels. Appendix B, Table B.I, reports the 2SLS regression results for the full 
sample as well as the subsamples divided based on industry relatedness. We continue to find a 
positive and statistically significant impact of advisor industry specialization on acquirer CAR in 
cross-industry acquisitions only.    
                                                          
18
 Note that the cut-off point of zero is theoretically determined. Based on Equation (2), a zero ARCA value suggests 
that the advisor does not do more or less M&A deals in an industry compared to an “average” bank.  
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Second, when there is more than one financial advisor involved in a deal, we assign the 
highest ARCA value among the advisors to that deal. This approach may overstate the degree of 
advisor industry specialization, leading to biased estimates of the corresponding parameter. To 
address this problem, we re-conduct our CAR analysis using the average ARCA value for deals 
with multiple advisors. Appendix B, Table B.II, presents the 2SLS regression results and we find 
our key findings remain unchanged. 
Third, we measure the ARCA index based on the value of deals advised by each acquirer 
advisor in an industry. However, compared with the value basis, the number basis may better 
capture the situations where advisors have developed industry expertise through processing 
many, albeit small, M&A transactions (e.g. Balsam, et al. (2003); Benou, Gleason and Madura 
(2007)). We thus recompute the ARCA index based on the number (as opposed to value) of 
M&A transactions that each advisor has advised in an industry over the last five years prior to 
the deal announcement. The results, reported in Appendix B, Table B.III, indicate that the 
positive relation between advisor industry specialization and acquirer CAR in cross-industry 
deals is robust to this alternative measure of ARCA.   
Finally, investment banks may specialize in more broadly defined industries in order to 
maximize the benefits from economies of scale (Dunbar (2000)). We check whether our results 
are sensitive to alternative industry classifications by re-computing the ARCA index based on 
the 2-digit SIC code and Fama-French 12 industry classification, respectively. We find our 
findings are not sensitive to industry classifications, as indicated by the results shown in 
Appendix B, Table B.IV.  
Having established the robustness of our findings, we proceed to investigate the 
economic sources through which a specialist advisor improves acquirer abnormal returns in the 
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following sections. We focus our attention on those M&A transactions in which advisor industry 
specialization matters, namely, cross-industry acquisitions, acquisitions with above-mean target 
idiosyncratic return volatility, and acquisitions where acquiring firms have no recent acquisition 
experience in the target’s industry. 
4.6. Source of Value Creation 
Specialist advisors may improve acquisition performance because they have extensive 
knowledge of and connections with firms operating in their specialized industries. As a result, 
specialist advisors may have better ability to identify targets that suit the acquirer’s current 
business portfolio, leading to M&A deals with higher synergy. It is also possible that specialist 
advisors’ superior industry knowledge provides them with an information advantage about the 
true value of the target firms operating in their specialized industries. This allows specialist 
advisors to help an acquirer avoid overpayment or purchase the target at a lower price (for 
example, by pricing the target more accurately and/or better negotiation). We examine these 
contentions by investigating whether advisor industry specialization is associated with deals with 
higher acquisition synergy and takeover premiums.   
4.6.1. Acquisition Synergy 
We measure acquisition synergy as combined announcement returns received by acquirer 
and target shareholders (e.g., Wang and Xie (2009), Cai and Sevilir (2012)). Following Wang 
and Xie (2009), we first construct a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target for 
each M&A transaction. The weights are the market capitalization of the respective firms 11 days 
prior to the announcement date, with the target’s weight adjusted for the value of target equity 
held by the acquirer before the deal announcement. The acquisition synergy is then defined as 
the portfolio’s cumulative abnormal returns (PCAR) over a three-day event window. Note that 
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this analysis significantly reduces our sample size since we can only compute acquisition 
synergy for publicly listed target firms. 
Table 8 estimates the 2SLS regressions of PCAR on the choice of an industry specialist 
advisor for the subsamples of cross-industry deals, acquisitions of target firms with above-mean 
idiosyncratic return volatility, and acquisitions in which acquirers lack acquisition experience in 
the target’s industry. We include the same set of IVs and control variables as in our acquirer 
CAR analysis, except that: (1) the interaction term between the top-8 advisor and public target 
variables is excluded; and (2) the six interaction terms between target listing status and payment 
method are replaced by the payment include stock variable, due to multicollinearity problems.  
Columns (1), (3) and (5) report the first-stage regression results for each subsample. We 
find that our instruments are positive and significant at the 1% level in each first-stage regression 
model. The F-test statistics for weak identification exceed the Stock-Yogo critical value of 19.93 
for a 10% maximal size distortion in all specifications, indicating that our instruments satisfy the 
relevance condition. The Hansen-J statistics for over-identification of all IVs fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of valid instruments, indicating that our instruments are statistically “exogenous” 
for each of the second-stage regressions. 
Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 8 presents the second-stage regression results. We find 
that the industry specialist dummy variable (instrumented) is positive but statistically 
insignificant in each subsample. Thus, the positive CAR we document in Table 3 does not appear 
to be driven by specialist advisors’ ability to identify more synergistic targets, at least in public 
transactions. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4.6.2. Takeover Premium 
37 
 
Another way for industry specialist advisors to produce superior acquirer abnormal 
returns is to help acquirers reduce acquisition costs, through either their negotiation skills or deal 
pricing. To investigate this possibility, we examine whether the use of industry specialist 
advisors is associated with lower takeover premiums. We measure takeover premium using the 
methodology developed by Officer (2007), which allows us to include both listed and unlisted 
targets. Specifically, we proxy the takeover premium by using the price-to-earnings (PE) 
multiple, which compares the price offered by the acquirer for the target to the total earnings 
made by the target for the year before the acquisition (e.g., Officer (2007)). We use the PE 
multiples reported by SDC for acquisitions of public targets. When a deal involves an unlisted 
target, the premium is defined as the average premium paid for a portfolio of comparable public 
targets that are within the same 3-digit SIC industry and year as the unlisted targets, consistent 
with Officer (2007) and Harford, Humphery-Jenner and Powell (2012).  
In Table 9, we report the 2SLS regression results of takeover premium, while controlling 
for the same set of firm and deal characteristics as in our CAR analysis. Columns (1), (3) and (5) 
provide the first-stage regression results for the subsample of cross-industry deals, targets with 
above-mean idiosyncratic return volatility, and acquirers without prior acquisition experience in 
the target’s industry. Again, in all specifications, we find no evidence that our instrumentation 
violates the exclusion restriction, as indicated by the insignificant Hansen-J test statistics. The F-
test statistics are well above the threshold of the Stock-Yogo critical value, indicating that weak 
identification is unlikely to be a concern.  
 Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 9 present the second-stage regression results. In all 
columns, we observe a negative and significant impact of the industry specialist dummy variable 
(instrumented) on the level of takeover premiums. The coefficient estimates suggest that when an 
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industry specialist advisor is hired, takeover premiums paid by acquirers are reduced by 16.69 
percentage points in cross-industry deals, 19.82 percentage points in acquisitions of targets with 
high idiosyncratic return volatility, and 11.96 percentage points in deals where acquirers lack 
relevant past acquisition experience. We also repeat the test with alternative measures of 
takeover premiums including price to book value of equity, deal value to sales, the percentage 
premium of offer price over the target price four weeks before deal announcement, and the 
acquirer’s share of dollar-denominated surplus computed based on actual (as opposed to proxy) 
premium. We find our inferences are not affected (unreported). Overall, the lower premiums 
associated with the use of industry specialist advisors provide an explanation for the superior 
acquirer abnormal returns we observe in transactions characterized by more severe information 
problems.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
5. Conclusion 
Inspired by the recent trend of investment banks’ industry specialization, this paper 
examines the impact of advisor industry specialization on deal performance for a sample of U.S. 
M&A transactions announced between 1985 and 2010. We find that industry specialist advisors 
help acquirers garner higher announcement returns, but this occurs only in deals where the 
acquirer faces significant challenges in evaluating a target due to its unfamiliarity of the target’s 
industry. In contrast to prior research that emphasizes the value-added role of large, reputable 
advisors, we find that the value created by advisor industry specialization primarily resides in 
those small- to medium-sized specialist advisors. Furthermore, advisors specializing in the 
target’s industry create more shareholder value for an acquirer client than do those specializing 
in the acquirer’s industry, suggesting that the knowledge of target industry is more helpful to 
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acquirers. Finally, we show that specialist advisors add value primarily through their ability to 
more accurately evaluate target firms. Overall, our results suggest that advisor industry 
specialization is economically beneficial from the acquirer’s perspective.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable                   Definition 
Panel A: Dependent Variables and Industry Specialization 
CAR (-1, 1) 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiring 
firm stock over the event window (-1, +1) 
surrounding the announcement date. The return 
is calculated using the market model with the 
CRSP value-weighted index as a benchmark. 
The model parameters are estimated over the (-
300, -91) period prior to the announcement.  
Combined CAR Combined cumulative announcement returns 
received by acquire and target shareholders 
over the event window (-1, +1) surrounding the 
announcement date. 
Takeover premium The premium is defined as the price-to-
earnings multiple reported by SDC for public 
acquisitions; and the average price-to-earnings 
for a portfolio of comparable public targets for 
non-public targets acquisitions.  
Advisor industry specialization The relative degree of advisors’ specialization 
in the acquirer (target) industry determined by 
the ARCA measure. It is calculated based on 
the total value of deals advised by an advisor in 
the acquirer’s (target’s) industry over the last 
five years prior to the announcement date, 
where the industry is defined by the 3-digit SIC 
code. 
Industry specialist advisor A dummy variable equal to 1 if the advisor is 
classified as a specialist if the ARCA value is 
above 0; and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics  
Log (Deal Size) The natural logarithm of the value of the 
transaction in millions of $US dollars. 
Relative Size The deal value divided by the market value of 
the bidding firm’s equity one month prior to the 
announcement date. 
Relatedness A dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer 
and the target are operating in the same 
industries with a common 3-digit SIC code and 
0 otherwise. 
Public Target A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bid is for 
public target and 0 otherwise. 
Private Target A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bid is for 
private target and 0 otherwise. 
Subsidiary Target A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bid is for 
subsidiary target and 0 otherwise. 
44 
 
Foreign Target A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bid is for 
foreign target and 0 otherwise. 
All –Cash Deals A dummy variable equal to 1 if the payment is 
pure cash and 0 otherwise. 
Pmt. Incl. Stock A dummy variable equal to 1 if the payment 
includes stock and 0 otherwise. 
Tender Offer A dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is a 
tender offer and 0 otherwise. 
Hostile A dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is 
classified as “hostile” by Thompson Financial 
SDC and 0 otherwise. 
Acq. (Targ.) Industry M&A Industry M&A The total value of all M&A transactions 
reported by SDC for each prior year and 3-digit 
SIC code over the book value of total assets of 
all Compustat firms in the same year and 3-
digit SIC code. 
Multiple Bidders A dummy variable equal to 1 if there are 
multiple bidders and 0 otherwise. 
Panel C: Acquirer Characteristics 
Acquirer Size The market value of the bidding firm’s equity 1 
month prior to the announcement date in 
millions of $US dollars. 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets divided by book value 
of assets for the fiscal year prior to the 
acquisition. The market value of assets is equal 
to book value of assets plus market value of 
common stock minus book value of common 
stock minus balance sheet deferred taxes. 
Run-up Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of the 
acquirer’s stock over a 200-day window (-205, 
-6). 
Sigma Standard deviation of the market-adjusted daily 
returns of the acquirer’s stock over a 200-day 
window (-205, -6). 
Leverage The sum of long-term debt and short-term debt 
divided by the market value of total assets 
measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to 
the acquisition. 
Free Cash Flow Operating income before depreciation minus 
interest expense minus income tax plus changes 
in deferred taxes and investment tax credits 
minus dividends on both preferred and 
common share divided by the book value of 
total assets at the fiscal year-end before the 
announcement date. 
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Appendix B: Robustness Checks 
Table B.I 
Industry Specialist Advisors Based on the Top Third and Bottom Third of the ARCA Index 
This table re-examines the relation between advisor industry specialization and acquirer CARs for the full sample as well as the 
cross- and same-industry deal subsamples, using industry specialist advisors defined based only on the top third and bottom third 
of the ARCA index. In each model, the first column reports the results from the first-stage regression of the use of industry 
specialist advisor, equal to 1 if an acquirer hires an industry specialist advisor in the top third of the ARCA index, and 0 
otherwise. The instrumental variables are the same as those used in Table 3. The second column reports the results for the 
second-stage regression of acquirer CAR over the event window (-1, +1). All variables are defined in Appendix A. The z-
statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 Full  Cross-industry  Same-industry 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Industry Specialist – Top and 
Bottom 3rd of the ARCA Index 
 0.0081   0.0134**   0.0002 
  (1.5871)   (2.1853)   (0.0284) 
Top 8 -0.0043 0.0077**  0.0102 0.0121**  -0.0161 0.0007 
 (-0.2273) (2.0579)  (0.3840) (2.5096)  (-0.6177) (0.1593) 
Top 8 * Pub. Target -0.0060 -0.0066  0.0209 -0.0073  -0.0256 -0.0051 
 (-0.2432) (-1.4807)  (0.5924) (-1.1815)  (-0.7524) (-0.8879) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) 0.0152*** -0.0022**  0.0039 -0.0029**  0.0306*** -0.0012 
 (2.5867) (-2.2828)  (0.5083) (-2.2144)  (3.7571) (-0.8551) 
Tobin's Q 0.0058* -0.0013  0.0060 -0.0027**  0.0048 -0.0006 
 (1.8887) (-1.3328)  (1.2351) (-2.5308)  (1.2132) (-0.4895) 
Free Cash Flow 0.0733** -0.0291**  0.0901* -0.0263*  0.0482 -0.0319 
 (2.0081) (-2.3389)  (1.8934) (-1.7630)  (0.8705) (-1.6419) 
Leverage -0.0030 0.0207**  0.0506 0.0100  -0.0364 0.0274* 
 (-0.0572) (2.0216)  (0.6985) (0.7452)  (-0.4764) (1.8980) 
Run-up 0.0007 -0.0034  -0.0032 -0.0045  0.0052 -0.0037 
 (0.0532) (-0.8823)  (-0.1719) (-0.9817)  (0.2739) (-0.6627) 
Sigma 0.1455 0.2786*  0.3446 0.2259  0.1016 0.3815* 
 (0.2543) (1.8556)  (0.4209) (1.1176)  (0.1238) (1.7327) 
Ln (Deal Value) -0.0131** -0.0033***  -0.0117 -0.0041***  -0.0183** -0.0020 
 (-2.1196) (-2.6231)  (-1.4157) (-2.5973)  (-2.0016) (-1.1636) 
Relative Size 0.0090* 0.0042***  0.0076 0.0047***  0.0113 0.0038 
 (1.8415) (2.7959)  (1.3543) (2.7716)  (1.5323) (1.3469) 
Tender 0.0171 0.0122**  -0.0035 0.0130**  0.0309 0.0063 
 (0.6452) (2.1068)  (-0.1043) (1.9968)  (0.7098) (1.0640) 
Hostile 0.0040 -0.0187**  0.0407 -0.0228*  -0.0167 -0.0089 
 (0.0784) (-1.9940)  (0.6892) (-1.8428)  (-0.1853) (-0.7233) 
Relatedness -0.0099 0.0017       
 (-0.7259) (0.7158)       
Pub. Target * All-Cash 0.0064 -0.0098**  -0.0192 -0.0098*  0.0328 -0.0075 
 (0.2378) (-2.3255)  (-0.5245) (-1.6449)  (0.7668) (-1.3767) 
Pub. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0320* -0.0399***  0.0060 -0.0410***  0.0517* -0.0395*** 
 (1.6665) (-10.7188)  (0.2154) (-7.6338)  (1.8509) (-7.7591) 
Priv. Target * All-Cash -0.0057 0.0011  -0.0697* 0.0058  0.0401 -0.0068 
 (-0.2135) (0.1730)  (-1.8134) (0.8215)  (1.0749) (-1.0281) 
Priv. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0596*** -0.0043  0.0454 -0.0060  0.0751*** -0.0027 
 (3.0296) (-1.0668)  (1.5315) (-0.9489)  (2.7561) (-0.5007) 
Sub. Target * All-Cash -0.0233 0.0049  -0.0382 0.0023  -0.0026 0.0067 
 (-0.9622) (1.1775)  (-1.2079) (0.3890)  (-0.0709) (1.1674) 
Foreign Target -0.0272 -0.0028  -0.0168 -0.0030  -0.0347 -0.0021 
 (-1.3606) (-0.7970)  (-0.5990) (-0.6314)  (-1.2020) (-0.3902) 
Multiple Bidders 0.0071 0.0104  0.0303 0.0109  -0.0371 0.0006 
 (0.2382) (1.1719)  (0.7631) (1.1909)  (-0.7343) (0.0698) 
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Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) -0.0023 -0.0016*  -0.0123** -0.0008  0.0053 -0.0017 
 (-0.4580) (-1.6449)  (-2.0996) (-0.7104)  (0.6893) (-1.0921) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) -0.0063 0.0007  -0.0093 0.0011    
 (-1.2507) (0.8386)  (-1.5647) (1.2606)    
Average Use of Specialist by 
Industry Peers 
0.7146***   0.7637***   0.6571***  
 (19.6182)   (13.4948)   (13.2748)  
Average Use of Specialist by 
Geographic Peers 
0.8933***   0.8824***   0.9110***  
 (41.3519)   (32.6725)   (24.9497)  
Intercept -0.2829** 0.0925***  -0.0732 0.1148***  -0.4914*** 0.0556* 
 (-2.1781) (4.2644)  (-0.3935) (3.9951)  (-2.8934) (1.9400) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N 4910 4910  2249 2249  2661 2661 
Hansen J Chi2 - 0.492  - 0.040  - 0.167 
p-value - 0.483  - 0.842  - 0.683 
IV strength test - 1379.491  - 844.928  - 490.163 
F 61.828*** 7.311***  37.699*** 4.169***  29.537*** 4.734*** 
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Table B.II 
Industry Specialist Advisors Based on Average ARCA 
This table re-examines the relation between advisor industry specialization and acquirer CARs for the full sample as well as the 
cross- and same-industry deal subsamples, using industry specialist advisors defined based on the average ARCA value when 
multiple advisors are involved in a deal. In each model, the first column reports the results from the first-stage regression of the 
use of industry specialist advisor, where the instrumental variables are the same as those employed in Table 3. The second 
column reports the results for the second-stage regression of acquirer CAR over the event window (-1, +1). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The z-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, 
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 Full  Cross-industry  Same-industry 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Industry Specialist - Avg. ARCA  0.0125   0.0210**   -0.0069 
  (1.5265)   (2.5151)   (-0.4462) 
Top 8 0.0464*** 0.0056*  0.0333 0.0089**  0.0551*** 0.0007 
 (2.6283) (1.6748)  (1.2983) (2.0262)  (2.6486) (0.1816) 
Top 8 * Pub. Target 0.0064 -0.0070*  0.0138 -0.0082  0.0049 -0.0040 
 (0.2787) (-1.7110)  (0.3982) (-1.4474)  (0.1738) (-0.7820) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) 0.0028 -0.0025***  0.0124* -0.0027**  -0.0046 -0.0026** 
 (0.5683) (-2.7989)  (1.7644) (-2.3005)  (-0.6757) (-2.0304) 
Tobin's Q 0.0024 -0.0012  0.0034 -0.0027***  0.0009 -0.0003 
 (0.8491) (-1.3418)  (0.7595) (-2.7472)  (0.2521) (-0.2591) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0072 -0.0242**  -0.0019 -0.0234  -0.0070 -0.0268 
 (-0.2088) (-2.0751)  (-0.0396) (-1.6411)  (-0.1516) (-1.4718) 
Leverage 0.0198 0.0204**  -0.0066 0.0146  0.0288 0.0185 
 (0.4309) (2.2634)  (-0.1010) (1.2203)  (0.4868) (1.4666) 
Run-up 0.0094 -0.0053  0.0021 -0.0058  0.0138 -0.0057 
 (0.7146) (-1.5165)  (0.1115) (-1.3783)  (0.7774) (-1.1005) 
Sigma 1.0926** 0.2736**  1.3480* 0.1971  0.6370 0.3722* 
 (2.1834) (2.0347)  (1.7531) (1.0634)  (0.9402) (1.9336) 
Ln (Deal Value) 0.0072 -0.0021  0.0003 -0.0027*  0.0086 -0.0004 
 (1.1983) (-1.6152)  (0.0361) (-1.7062)  (1.2153) (-0.2354) 
Relative Size 0.0037 0.0043***  0.0083 0.0044***  0.0034 0.0040 
 (0.6485) (2.9108)  (1.4884) (2.6044)  (0.3675) (1.5570) 
Tender -0.0249 0.0098  -0.0588 0.0121*  0.0326 0.0034 
 (-0.8358) (1.6103)  (-1.4978) (1.7246)  (0.9388) (0.6372) 
Hostile 0.0151 -0.0184**  -0.0372 -0.0217**  0.0851 -0.0112 
 (0.3101) (-2.1858)  (-0.5960) (-1.9617)  (1.2444) (-1.0830) 
Relatedness -0.1941*** 0.0055**       
 (-15.9070) (2.1303)       
Pub. Target * All-Cash -0.0059 -0.0086**  -0.0112 -0.0086  -0.0071 -0.0076 
 (-0.2459) (-2.1785)  (-0.3122) (-1.5428)  (-0.2230) (-1.5121) 
Pub. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0486*** -0.0396***  -0.0531* -0.0386***  -0.0356 -0.0421*** 
 (-2.7741) (-11.5787)  (-1.9327) (-7.8382)  (-1.6204) (-9.1969) 
Priv. Target * All-Cash -0.0410 0.0007  -0.0792* 0.0107  0.0044 -0.0116** 
 (-1.3214) (0.1041)  (-1.8365) (1.4259)  (0.1325) (-1.9842) 
Priv. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0199 -0.0010  -0.0010 -0.0004  -0.0173 -0.0021 
 (-1.0956) (-0.2532)  (-0.0335) (-0.0649)  (-0.7929) (-0.4164) 
Sub. Target * All-Cash -0.0250 0.0032  -0.0362 0.0022  -0.0132 0.0040 
 (-1.2491) (0.9181)  (-1.2265) (0.4410)  (-0.5134) (0.8279) 
Foreign Target 0.0274 -0.0052*  0.0396 -0.0047  0.0106 -0.0048 
 (1.6295) (-1.6746)  (1.5535) (-1.0945)  (0.4970) (-1.0700) 
Multiple Bidders -0.0666* 0.0073  -0.0556 0.0129  -0.0823** -0.0064 
 (-1.6528) (0.7741)  (-1.0830) (1.2968)  (-2.2741) (-0.9417) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) 0.0076* -0.0018**  0.0001 -0.0013  0.0192*** -0.0012 
 (1.6465) (-2.0422)  (0.0188) (-1.2571)  (3.3858) (-0.9357) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) 0.0018 0.0004  -0.0049 0.0004    
 (0.4258) (0.5129)  (-1.0184) (0.4616)    
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Average Use of Specialists  
by Industry Peers 
0.2186***   0.3784***   0.0836*  
 (5.6184)   (6.0722)   (1.8475)  
Average Use of Specialists  
by Geographic Peers 
0.5088***   0.6184***   0.3744***  
 (22.5357)   (21.2792)   (12.0264)  
Intercept -0.1068 0.0769***  -0.2455 0.0764***  -0.1268 0.0716*** 
 (-0.9880) (3.7102)  (-1.4335) (2.8024)  (-0.9729) (2.7185) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N 6121 6121  2856 2856  3265 3265 
Hansen J Chi2 - 0.076  - 0.088  - 0.272 
p-value - 0.783  - 0.767  - 0.602 
Instrument Strength Test  297.205   286.770   84.276 
F 21.837*** 8.986***  16.634*** 4.666***  6.277*** 6.169*** 
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Table B.III 
Constructing the ARCA Index Based on the Number of Deals 
This table re-estimates the impact of industry specialist advisors on acquirer CARs for the full sample as well as the cross- and 
same-industry deal subsamples. Advisor industry specialization is measured by the ARCA index constructed based on the total 
number (as opposed to value) of deals advised by each acquirer advisor over the last five years prior to deal announcement. In 
each model, the first column reports the results from the first-stage regression of the use of industry specialist advisor, where the 
instrumental variables are the same as those employed in Table 3. The second column reports the results for the second-stage 
regression of acquirer CAR over the event window (-1, +1). All variables are defined in Appendix A. The z-statistics statistics in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 Full  Cross-industry  Same-industry 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Industry Specialist – Num. Basis  0.0092   0.0192**   -0.0038 
  (1.5489)   (2.5378)   (-0.4704) 
Top 8 0.0144 0.0060*  0.0500** 0.0086**  -0.0239 0.0002 
 (0.8518) (1.7973)  (2.1510) (1.9928)  (-0.9719) (0.0398) 
Top 8 * Pub. Target -0.0294 -0.0066  -0.0129 -0.0076  -0.0336 -0.0039 
 (-1.3096) (-1.6254)  (-0.4055) (-1.3569)  (-1.0307) (-0.7790) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) 0.0099* -0.0026***  0.0063 -0.0026**  0.0140* -0.0026** 
 (1.7030) (-2.8983)  (0.8011) (-2.1610)  (1.7657) (-1.9763) 
Tobin's Q -0.0004 -0.0012  -0.0028 -0.0026***  0.0018 -0.0003 
 (-0.1421) (-1.2971)  (-0.5783) (-2.5950)  (0.4903) (-0.2522) 
Free Cash Flow 0.0185 -0.0250**  0.0419 -0.0242*  -0.0052 -0.0282 
 (0.4363) (-2.1751)  (0.7594) (-1.7134)  (-0.0958) (-1.5550) 
Leverage 0.0383 0.0194**  0.0501 0.0135  0.0316 0.0166 
 (0.8209) (2.1613)  (0.7977) (1.1337)  (0.4797) (1.3248) 
Run-up 0.0145 -0.0052  0.0257 -0.0063  0.0070 -0.0056 
 (1.2032) (-1.4794)  (1.6065) (-1.4960)  (0.3942) (-1.0682) 
Sigma -0.5252 0.2626*  -0.7899 0.2408  -0.2906 0.3076 
 (-0.9885) (1.9537)  (-1.0691) (1.2913)  (-0.3892) (1.6204) 
Ln (Deal Value) -0.0032 -0.0020  -0.0006 -0.0026*  -0.0056 -0.0005 
 (-0.5581) (-1.5777)  (-0.0699) (-1.7197)  (-0.6852) (-0.3398) 
Relative Size 0.0042 0.0044***  0.0020 0.0046***  0.0074 0.0043 
 (0.9237) (2.9718)  (0.3429) (2.6783)  (0.9630) (1.6418) 
Tender -0.0030 0.0098*  -0.0010 0.0109  -0.0047 0.0036 
 (-0.1300) (1.6599)  (-0.0305) (1.6388)  (-0.1430) (0.6835) 
Hostile -0.0036 -0.0183**  0.0309 -0.0231**  -0.0436 -0.0120 
 (-0.0825) (-2.2018)  (0.5236) (-2.1356)  (-0.6616) (-1.1841) 
Relatedness -0.0042 0.0030       
 (-0.3383) (1.4011)       
Pub. Target * All-Cash 0.0199 -0.0094**  0.0120 -0.0091  0.0219 -0.0085* 
 (0.8414) (-2.4059)  (0.3538) (-1.6220)  (0.6632) (-1.7503) 
Pub. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0164 -0.0404***  0.0179 -0.0401***  0.0094 -0.0418*** 
 (0.9615) (-11.9898)  (0.7269) (-8.1518)  (0.3763) (-9.1684) 
Priv. Target * All-Cash 0.0095 0.0001  0.0225 0.0086  -0.0038 -0.0117** 
 (0.3847) (0.0100)  (0.6807) (1.2254)  (-0.1064) (-1.9936) 
Priv. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0357** -0.0014  0.0578** -0.0015  0.0164 -0.0016 
 (1.9886) (-0.3738)  (2.1245) (-0.2598)  (0.6675) (-0.3325) 
Sub. Target * All-Cash -0.0278 0.0031  -0.0119 0.0017  -0.0470 0.0038 
 (-1.2979) (0.8936)  (-0.4030) (0.3429)  (-1.5122) (0.7956) 
Foreign Target -0.0449** -0.0044  -0.0340 -0.0031  -0.0527** -0.0052 
 (-2.5330) (-1.4331)  (-1.3504) (-0.7344)  (-2.0566) (-1.1377) 
Multiple Bidders 0.0077 0.0065  0.0106 0.0115  0.0087 -0.0059 
 (0.2738) (0.7265)  (0.2628) (1.2350)  (0.2053) (-0.8725) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) 0.0033 -0.0018**  0.0002 -0.0013  0.0080 -0.0014 
 (0.7619) (-2.0618)  (0.0454) (-1.2579)  (1.3547) (-1.1819) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) -0.0014 0.0004  -0.0041 0.0003    
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 (-0.3447) (0.5308)  (-0.8043) (0.4329)    
Average Use of Specialists 
by Industry Peers 
0.3995***   0.4115***   0.3815***  
 (10.4147)   (7.3057)   (7.3208)  
Average Use of Specialists 
by Geographic Peers 
0.6754***   0.6811***   0.6645***  
 (31.5351)   (24.6627)   (21.3094)  
Intercept -0.0343 0.0774***  -0.0726 0.0726***  0.0015 0.0762*** 
 (-0.2673) (3.7568)  (-0.4107) (2.6881)  (0.0090) (2.8894) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N 6119 6119  2855 2855  3264 3264 
Hansen J Chi2 - 0.101  - 0.089  - 0.099 
p-value - 0.750  - 0.766  - 0.753 
Instrument Strength Test  690.282   412.182   316.169 
F 36.282*** 8.946***  25.158*** 4.707***  18.413*** 6.161*** 
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Table B.IV 
Constructing the ARCA Index Based on Different Industry Classification 
This table examines the impact of industry specialist advisors on acquirer CARs for the full sample as well as the cross- and 
same-industry deal subsamples, using the ARCA index constructed based on different industry classifications. In Panel A, the 
ARCA value is measured based on the 2-digit SIC industry code; in Panel B, the ARCA value is calculated based on the Fama-
French 12 industry classification. All estimates are taken from the 2SLS regression model, with control variables the same as 
those shown in Table 3. For the sake of brevity, we report only the coefficient estimates on the industry specialist dummy 
variable (instrumented) and regression diagnostics. The z-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of 
observations. 
Panel A: Using the ARCA Index Constructed Based on the 2-digit SIC industry code 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Industry Specialist - 2-digit SIC (Instrumented) 0.0113 0.0292** 0.0023 
 (1.4938) (2.2654) (0.2772) 
    
Advisor Reputation YES YES YES 
Deal Characteristics YES YES YES 
Acquirer Characteristics YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
N 6121 2083 4038 
Hansen J Chi2 0.235 1.436 1.575 
p-value 0.628 0.231 0.210 
Instrument Strength Test 284.153 90.495 200.108 
F 9.061*** 4.200*** 7.126*** 
 
Panel B: Using the ARCA Index Constructed Based on the Fama-French 12 industry classification 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Industry Specialist - Fama-French 12 (Instrumented) 0.0169 0.0703* 0.0034 
 (1.2996) (1.6540) (0.2895) 
    
Advisor Reputation YES YES YES 
Deal Characteristics YES YES YES 
Acquirer Characteristics YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
N 6121 1393 4728 
Hansen J Chi2 0.723 1.223 2.423 
p-value 0.395 0.269 0.120 
Instrument Strength Test 86.978 9.978 92.936 
F 8.730*** 3.689*** 6.995*** 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of the ARCA value 
This figure shows the distribution of the ARCA value for acquirer advisors over the sample period between January 1985 and 
December 2010. The ARCA value is computed based on the value of M&A deals advised by an advisor in the acquirer and the 
target industry over the last 5 years prior to the announcement date, respectively. The industry is defined by 3-digit SIC code. 
Figure 1a (1b) depicts the distribution for the ARCA value based on the acquirer advisors’ activities in the acquirer (target) 
industry.  
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Table 1 
Sample Descriptive Statistics by Type of Advisors 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the key variables sorted by the type of advisors. The sample consists of 12,853 deals announced between January 1985 and December 
2010, in which there is at least one investment bank advising either the acquirer or the target. The data are drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC database. Panels A to C 
illustrate the mean, median and number of observations (“N”) for each variable for the full sample as well as for acquirer advisors with and without acquirer-industry focus. The 
statistics for acquirer advisors with and without target-industry focus are qualitatively similar to the results reported below but omitted for space consideration. Industry specialist 
advisors are classified based on the value of the ARCA index computed according to the value of deals advised by each advisor in the acquirer or target industry over 5 years prior 
to the announcement date. The industry is defined by 3-digit SIC code. Share price data for the bidding firms are obtained from CRSP while accounting data are downloaded from 
Computstat. Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to test the significance of differences in means and equality of medians for each variable sorted by the type of financial 
advisors.  
 
Full Sample (1) 
 
Industry Specialists (2) 
 
Non-industry Specialists (3) 
 
Difference (2) – (3) in 
 
Mean Median N 
 
Mean Median N 
 
Mean Median N 
 
Mean Median 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
Deal Value (in 
$mil) 
684.029 135.000 12852 
 
810.984 151.828 6665 
 
614.123 140.000 5355 
 
196.861*** 11.828*** 
Relative Size 0.451 0.192 9131 
 
0.403 0.170 4936 
 
0.467 0.218 3723 
 
-0.064*** -0.048*** 
Public Targets 0.365 - 12852 
 
0.385 - 6665 
 
0.344 - 5355 
 
0.041*** - 
Private 
Targets 
0.304 - 12852 
 
0.310 - 6665 
 
0.288 - 5355 
 
0.022*** - 
Subsidiary 
Targets 
0.323 - 12852 
 
0.297 - 6665 
 
0.360 - 5355 
 
-0.063*** - 
Foreign 
Targets 
0.142 - 12852 
 
0.118 - 6665 
 
0.154 - 5355 
 
-0.035*** - 
Relatedness 0.601 - 12852 
 
0.613 - 6665 
 
0.589 - 5355 
 
0.023*** - 
Tender Offer 0.092 - 12852 
 
0.082 - 6665 
 
0.104 - 5355 
 
-0.022*** - 
Hostile Deal 0.018 - 12852 
 
0.015 - 6665 
 
0.023 - 5355 
 
-0.008*** - 
All-Cash 0.276 - 12852 
 
0.262 - 6665 
 
0.298 - 5355 
 
-0.036*** - 
Pmt. include 
Stock 
0.389 - 12852 
 
0.434 - 6665 
 
0.337 - 5355 
 
0.097*** - 
Multiple 
Bidders 
0.040 - 12842 
 
0.042 - 6661 
 
0.041 - 5351 
 
0.001 - 
Acq. Ind. 
M&A 
-2.272 -2.184 12198 
 
-2.346 -2.215 6393 
 
-2.194 -2.119 5027 
 
-0.151*** -0.096*** 
Targ. Ind. 
M&A 
-2.169 -2.155 12179 
 
-2.257 -2.205 6433 
 
-2.056 -2.045 4963 
 
-0.201*** -0.160** 
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Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics 
Acquirer Size 
(in $mil) 
6861.037 787.534 9150 
 
7858.925 939.825 4941 
 
6191.661 725.170 3730 
 
1667.264*** 214.655*** 
Tobin's Q 2.436 1.534 7840 
 
2.552 1.511 4251 
 
2.316 1.574 3199 
 
0.236** -0.063* 
Run-up 0.078 0.015 9201 
 
0.086 0.021 4969 
 
0.069 0.008 3746 
 
0.016 0.012*** 
Free Cash 
Flow 
0.052 0.085 7812 
 
0.049 0.077 4198 
 
0.058 0.094 3219 
 
-0.010** -0.017*** 
Leverage 0.147 0.104 7827 
 
0.145 0.102 4247 
 
0.151 0.109 3194 
 
-0.006 -0.006** 
Sigma 0.028 0.023 9202 
 
0.028 0.023 4970 
 
0.028 0.024 3746 
 
0.000 -0.001** 
Panel C: Dependent Variables 
CAR(-1, +1) 0.003 0.000 8266 
 
0.000 -0.003 4481 
 
0.007 0.002 3367 
 
-0.007*** -0.005*** 
Premium 
Offered 
43.30% 35.28% 3861  43.30% 35.28% 2134  45.30% 36.43% 1513  -2.00% -1.16% 
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Table 2 
Industry Specialists and Acquirer CAR: Ordinary Least Squares 
This table presents results from the OLS regression of the acquirer three-day CAR for the full sample as well as the cross- 
and same-industry deal subsamples. In each column, the main variable of interest is “Industry Specialist”, which is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the acquirer advisor specializes in the acquirer or target industry; 0 otherwise. Other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The t-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 Full Cross-industry Same-industry 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Industry Specialist -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0010 
 (-0.1447) (0.0870) (-0.3633) 
Top 8 0.0068** 0.0105** 0.0006 
 (2.0048) (2.4050) (0.1633) 
Top 8 * Pub. Target -0.0068* -0.0088 -0.0030 
 (-1.6648) (-1.5772) (-0.5967) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) -0.0023*** -0.0022* -0.0025** 
 (-2.6507) (-1.8692) (-2.0066) 
Tobin's Q -0.0013 -0.0027*** -0.0003 
 (-1.3986) (-2.7621) (-0.2760) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0256** -0.0258* -0.0266 
 (-2.2535) (-1.9304) (-1.4512) 
Leverage 0.0189** 0.0132 0.0170 
 (2.1641) (1.1219) (1.3888) 
Run-up -0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0063 
 (-1.4773) (-1.3125) (-1.2037) 
Sigma 0.3208** 0.3038* 0.3768* 
 (2.4019) (1.6517) (1.9609) 
Ln (Deal Value) -0.0018 -0.0025* -0.0001 
 (-1.4275) (-1.6594) (-0.0827) 
Relative Size 0.0045*** 0.0047*** 0.0042 
 (3.0429) (2.6818) (1.5679) 
Tender 0.0094 0.0112* 0.0027 
 (1.5894) (1.6669) (0.5065) 
Hostile -0.0191** -0.0228** -0.0123 
 (-2.3527) (-2.1417) (-1.2456) 
Relatedness 0.0027   
 (1.2659)   
Pub. Target * All-Cash -0.0084** -0.0079 -0.0076 
 (-2.2105) (-1.4685) (-1.5510) 
Pub. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0401*** -0.0388*** -0.0424*** 
 (-11.9966) (-8.0062) (-9.4105) 
Priv. Target * All-Cash 0.0005 0.0101 -0.0114** 
 (0.0806) (1.4065) (-1.9709) 
Priv. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0003 0.0009 -0.0015 
 (-0.0868) (0.1646) (-0.3139) 
Sub. Target * All-Cash 0.0036 0.0022 0.0047 
 (1.0418) (0.4502) (0.9707) 
Foreign Target -0.0051* -0.0044 -0.0047 
 (-1.6699) (-1.0527) (-1.0565) 
Multiple Bidders 0.0062 0.0125 -0.0067 
 (0.7010) (1.3377) (-1.0142) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) -0.0015* -0.0012 -0.0009 
 (-1.7120) (-1.1476) (-0.7759) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) 0.0004 0.0002  
 (0.6051) (0.2669)  
Intercept 0.0716*** 0.0708*** 0.0644** 
 (3.5173) (2.6527) (2.4704) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
N 6269 2920 3349 
R2 0.113 0.141 0.107 
Adj. R2 0.104 0.124 0.091 
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Table 3 
Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) Regression of Acquirer CAR 
This table reports the results of the two-stage least square regression of acquirer CAR for the full sample as well as the cross- 
and same-industry deal subsamples, where an acquirer’s choice of an industry specialist advisor is instrumented by the 
average use of industry specialist advisors by the acquirer’s industry and geographic peers. Advisor industry specialization is 
measured using the ARCA method based on the value of deals advised by an advisor in an industry over the last five years 
prior to the announcement date. In each model, the first column reports the first-stage regression results, where the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an acquirer hires an industry specialist advisor, and 0 otherwise; 
whereas the second column reports the results for the second-stage regression of acquirer CAR over the event window (-1, 
+1). All variables are defined in Appendix A. The z-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of 
observations. 
 Full  Cross-industry  Same-industry 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Industry Specialist (Instrumented)  0.0063   0.0140
**   -0.0031 
  (1.4827)   (2.5505)   (-0.5432) 
Top 8 0.0287* 0.0060*  0.0427* 0.0090**  0.0183 0.0004 
 (1.8319) (1.8024)  (1.9452) (2.0774)  (0.8530) (0.1034) 
Top 8 * Pub. Target -0.0226 -0.0068*  0.0004 -0.0079  -0.0404 -0.0041 
 (-1.0748) (-1.6805)  (0.0143) (-1.4097)  (-1.4091) (-0.8111) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) 0.0147*** -0.0026***  0.0067 -0.0026**  0.0264*** -0.0025* 
 (2.8784) (-2.8775)  (1.0060) (-2.1621)  (3.6351) (-1.9280) 
Tobin's Q 0.0045 -0.0012  0.0045 -0.0027***  0.0038 -0.0003 
 (1.5929) (-1.3455)  (0.9972) (-2.7580)  (1.0410) (-0.2543) 
Free Cash Flow 0.0450 -0.0246**  0.0586 -0.0242*  0.0307 -0.0267 
 (1.3459) (-2.1160)  (1.3476) (-1.7128)  (0.6051) (-1.4672) 
Leverage 0.0276 0.0204**  0.0610 0.0136  0.0136 0.0184 
 (0.6441) (2.2765)  (0.9833) (1.1451)  (0.2207) (1.4579) 
Run-up 0.0042 -0.0053  -0.0016 -0.0057  0.0088 -0.0058 
 (0.3334) (-1.4987)  (-0.0959) (-1.3746)  (0.4964) (-1.1129) 
Sigma -0.1138 0.2878**  0.0957 0.2236  -0.2253 0.3665* 
 (-0.2301) (2.1440)  (0.1331) (1.2106)  (-0.3236) (1.9041) 
Ln (Deal Value) -0.0111** -0.0019  -0.0109 -0.0025*  -0.0146* -0.0005 
 (-2.0372) (-1.5443)  (-1.5085) (-1.6522)  (-1.7963) (-0.3120) 
Relative Size 0.0095** 0.0043***  0.0075 0.0045***  0.0131** 0.0041 
 (2.2096) (2.9020)  (1.4815) (2.6316)  (1.9617) (1.5516) 
Tender 0.0092 0.0095  -0.0214 0.0112*  0.0418 0.0034 
 (0.4081) (1.6170)  (-0.7354) (1.6832)  (1.1668) (0.6297) 
Hostile -0.0096 -0.0182**  0.0079 -0.0226**  -0.0158 -0.0119 
 (-0.2231) (-2.1925)  (0.1375) (-2.0895)  (-0.2360) (-1.1614) 
Relatedness -0.0091 0.0031       
 (-0.7878) (1.4555)       
Pub. Target * All-Cash 0.0029 -0.0086**  -0.0196 -0.0086  0.0234 -0.0075 
 (0.1230) (-2.2129)  (-0.6270) (-1.5582)  (0.6547) (-1.4995) 
Pub. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0272 -0.0404***  0.0102 -0.0399***  0.0400 -0.0417*** 
 (1.6035) (-12.0070)  (0.4179) (-8.1508)  (1.6293) (-9.1349) 
Priv. Target * All-Cash -0.0130 0.0002  -0.0615* 0.0099  0.0288 -0.0115** 
 (-0.5599) (0.0355)  (-1.8887) (1.3865)  (0.8899) (-1.9627) 
Priv. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0469*** -0.0015  0.0385 -0.0009  0.0585** -0.0017 
 (2.6923) (-0.3984)  (1.4913) (-0.1651)  (2.4286) (-0.3479) 
Sub. Target * All-Cash -0.0266 0.0031  -0.0422 0.0020  -0.0096 0.0041 
 (-1.3556) (0.8768)  (-1.6430) (0.4050)  (-0.3287) (0.8408) 
Foreign Target -0.0329** -0.0046  -0.0189 -0.0036  -0.0464* -0.0050 
 (-2.0359) (-1.5163)  (-0.8498) (-0.8472)  (-1.9439) (-1.1161) 
Multiple Bidders -0.0005 0.0064  0.0520 0.0110  -0.0592 -0.0060 
 (-0.0204) (0.7227)  (1.3712) (1.1751)  (-1.5016) (-0.8999) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) 0.0001 -0.0017*  -0.0058 -0.0012  0.0066 -0.0013 
 (0.0360) (-1.9500)  (-1.2455) (-1.1794)  (1.1349) (-1.0472) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) -0.0016 0.0004  -0.0031 0.0003    
 (-0.4060) (0.5559)  (-0.6531) (0.3902)    
Average Use of Specialists  0.6320***   0.6551***   0.5971***  
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by Industry Peers 
 (20.2220)   (14.1635)   (13.7676)  
Average Use of Specialists  
by Geographic Peers 
0.9187***   0.9098***   0.9230***  
 (62.0820)   (46.7922)   (39.6664)  
Intercept -0.3281*** 0.0773***  -0.1523 0.0730***  -0.5094*** 0.0714*** 
 (-2.8858) (3.7570)  (-0.9466) (2.7197)  (-3.3960) (2.7153) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N 6121 6121  2856 2856  3265 3265 
Hansen J Chi2 - 0.237  - 0.031  - 0.173 
p-value - 0.626  - 0.861  - 0.678 
Instrument Strength Test - 2735.866  - 1589.779  - 1090.893 
F 138.019*** 9.031***  78.970*** 4.741***  69.601*** 6.184*** 
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Table 4 
Industry Market Share Approach versus ARCA Index 
Panel A of this Table shows the pairwise correlation between top-8, industry specialist advisors defined based on industry 
market share (IMS) approach and the ARCA value for the full sample. Panel B of this table reports the results of the two-
stage least square regression of acquirer CAR for the full sample as well as the cross- and same-industry deal subsamples, 
using industry specialists defined as those advisors in the top quartile of market share in the acquirer or target industry 
(Industry Specialist – IMS). Since the Industry Specialist - IMS and top-8 advisor variables are collinear, we use the 
orthogonalization process to capture the unique impact of industry specialization, uncorrelated with the impact of advisor 
reputation. In each model, the first column reports the first-stage regression results, where the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if an acquirer hires an industry specialist advisor in the top quartile of market share in the 
acquirer or target industry, and 0 otherwise. An acquirer’s choice of an industry specialist advisor is instrumented by the 
average use of industry specialist advisors by the acquirer’s industry and geographic peers. The second column reports the 
results for the second-stage regression of acquirer CAR over the event window (-1, +1). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The z-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, ** and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
Panel A: Pairwise Correlation 
 
 Top 8  Industry Specialist - Market Share  Industry Specialist - ARCA 
Top 8  1.0000     
Industry Specialist - IMS  0.4829  1.0000   
Industry Specialist - ARCA  0.0353  0.5025  1.0000 
 
Panel B: 2SLS Regressions of Acquirer CAR on the Use of Industry Specialists with Top-quartile Industry Market Share 
 Full  Cross-industry  Same-industry 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Ortho. Industry Specialist – 
IMS (Instrumented) 
 0.0067*   0.0136***   -0.0020 
  (1.7568)   (2.7328)   (-0.4375) 
Ortho. Top 8 -0.0671*** 0.0030  -0.0747*** 0.0054**  -0.0566** -0.0008 
 (-3.5436) (1.4937)  (-2.9685) (2.2507)  (-2.2676) (-0.3829) 
Ortho.Top 8 * Pub. Target -0.0473* -0.0019  -0.0678** -0.0019  -0.0305 -0.0005 
 (-1.9590) (-0.8926)  (-2.0151) (-0.6795)  (-0.9122) (-0.1756) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) 0.1177*** -0.0032***  0.1131*** -0.0037***  0.1273*** -0.0024* 
 (10.2911) (-3.5036)  (7.2453) (-2.9137)  (8.5819) (-1.7620) 
Tobin's Q -0.0032 -0.0008  -0.0094 -0.0023**  0.0009 0.0001 
 (-0.6006) (-0.9559)  (-1.2912) (-2.3217)  (0.1223) (0.0541) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0301 -0.0278**  0.0386 -0.0249*  -0.0969 -0.0326* 
 (-0.4724) (-2.5493)  (0.4644) (-1.8530)  (-0.9894) (-1.9143) 
Leverage 0.3297*** 0.0217**  0.4468*** 0.0127  0.1794 0.0221* 
 (3.1979) (2.4497)  (3.0093) (1.0506)  (1.4063) (1.7822) 
Run-up -0.0591** -0.0056  -0.0626* -0.0051  -0.0561* -0.0076 
 (-2.3497) (-1.6166)  (-1.7266) (-1.2111)  (-1.7028) (-1.4958) 
Sigma 2.3220** 0.2973**  1.2097 0.2964  3.1382** 0.3439* 
 (2.3709) (2.3076)  (0.8256) (1.6142)  (2.3653) (1.8927) 
Ln (Deal Value) 0.1492*** -0.0027*  0.1365*** -0.0041**  0.1491*** -0.0002 
 (12.5867) (-1.8490)  (8.2682) (-2.2962)  (9.5945) (-0.1004) 
Relative Size 0.0029 0.0037***  0.0039 0.0038***  0.0026 0.0039 
 (0.3508) (5.4037)  (0.4410) (5.9658)  (0.1646) (1.4903) 
Tender -0.0531 0.0095  -0.1802*** 0.0113*  0.0990 0.0051 
 (-0.9860) (1.6360)  (-2.5844) (1.6663)  (1.4197) (0.9483) 
Hostile -0.0718 -0.0173**  0.0131 -0.0200*  -0.1732 -0.0132 
 (-0.7793) (-2.1466)  (0.1064) (-1.9229)  (-1.3510) (-1.3139) 
Relatedness -0.0487* 0.0030       
 (-1.9454) (1.4117)       
Pub. Target * All-Cash -0.0051 -0.0124***  0.0473 -0.0140***  -0.0483 -0.0103** 
 (-0.1071) (-3.2126)  (0.6901) (-2.7273)  (-0.7184) (-2.1836) 
Pub. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0474 -0.0430***  -0.0636 -0.0435***  -0.0294 -0.0429*** 
 (-1.4482) (-14.3226)  (-1.2915) (-9.9358)  (-0.6664) (-10.2931) 
Priv. Target * All-Cash -0.0888 0.0009  -0.1798** 0.0088  -0.0009 -0.0094* 
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 (-1.6046) (0.1414)  (-2.4149) (1.2100)  (-0.0134) (-1.6505) 
Priv. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0585* -0.0018  -0.0200 -0.0036  -0.0730 -0.0011 
 (-1.6528) (-0.4707)  (-0.3674) (-0.6224)  (-1.5776) (-0.2185) 
Sub. Target * All-Cash -0.0320 0.0035  -0.0445 0.0020  -0.0143 0.0048 
 (-0.7848) (1.0098)  (-0.7980) (0.3993)  (-0.2415) (1.0260) 
Foreign Target -0.1045*** -0.0047  -0.1378*** -0.0030  -0.0840* -0.0051 
 (-3.1031) (-1.5926)  (-2.7935) (-0.7073)  (-1.8036) (-1.1715) 
Multiple Bidders -0.1876*** 0.0068  -0.1171 0.0108  -0.2126*** -0.0053 
 (-2.6244) (0.7444)  (-1.2438) (1.0885)  (-2.6121) (-0.8007) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) 0.0146 -0.0016*  -0.0054 -0.0008  0.0567*** -0.0012 
 (1.4254) (-1.7124)  (-0.4440) (-0.7254)  (4.3430) (-0.9844) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) 0.0165* 0.0003  0.0051 0.0005    
 (1.8668) (0.4115)  (0.4769) (0.6225)    
Average Use of Specialists  
by Industry Peers 
0.6062***   0.6605***   0.5683***  
 (7.5571)   (5.1849)   (5.9899)  
Average Use of Specialists  
by Geographic Peers 
1.1727***   1.1326***   1.2301***  
 (26.1343)   (17.9732)   (20.2610)  
Intercept -5.3755*** 0.1022***  -5.1062*** 0.1291***  -5.5065*** 0.0547 
 (-21.8128) (3.3942)  (-14.8774) (3.3976)  (-16.9265) (1.6096) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
N 6259 6259  2874 2874  3385 3385 
Hansen J Chi2 - 0.375  - 0.009  - 0.406 
p-value - 0.541  - 0.925  - 0.524 
Instrument Strength Test - 404.955  - 204.663  - 264.863 
F 56.749*** 9.292***  29.715*** 5.229***  36.790*** 6.099*** 
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Table 5 
Quartile Analysis of Acquirer CAR 
This table estimates the relation between industry specialist advisors and acquirer CAR for each quartile of investment bank 
size for a subsample of cross-industry deals using an IV approach. The investment bank size is measured on the basis of the 
value of M&A transactions advised by each bank over the last year prior to the announcement date. An acquirer’s choice of 
an industry specialist advisor is instrumented by the average use of industry specialist advisors by the acquirer’s industry and 
geographic peers. The first-stage regression results for the choice of an industry specialist are not reported here for brevity. 
The control variables are the same as those reported in Table 3, except that the top-8 advisor variable and its interaction with 
the public target dummy variable are not included given that the investment bank size is controlled for. For the sake of 
brevity, the table reports only the estimates for the main variable of interest, Industry Specialist, and the corresponding 
regression diagnostics. The z-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 Subsample: Cross-industry Deals 
 Industry Specialist 
(Instrumented) 
 N  Hansen J 
Chi2 
p-
value 
Instrument Strength 
Test 
 F  
Q1 0.0126  607  1.033 0.309 186.064  3.328***  
 (0.9628)          
Q2 0.0321***  662  0.233 0.630 327.298  3.850***  
 (3.1621)          
Q3 0.0097  648  1.177 0.278 394.668  2.366***  
 (1.0727)          
Q4 -0.0043  655  1.083 0.298 258.553  2.594***  
 (-0.3349)          
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Table 6 
Continuous Measures of Advisor Industry Specialization 
This table re-conducts acquirer CAR analysis for the full sample as well as the cross- and same-industry subsamples, using continuous measures of advisor industry Specialization. All estimates 
are taken from the 2SLS regression models, with the first-stage regression results omitted for the sake of brevity. Columns (1) through (3) present the results from the second-stage regression of 
the acquirer 3-day CAR on the level of an advisor’s specialization in the target firm’s industry (Specialization Level in Target Industry); columns (4) through (6) replicate the analysis using the 
acquirer advisor’s specializing level in the acquirer’s own industry (Specialization Level in Acquirer Industry). In columns (7) through (9), we report the results using the first principal 
component (PC1) of our two specialization measures. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The z-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer 
clustering. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 Specialization Level in Target Industry   Specialization Level in Acquirer Industry  PC1 
 Full Cross-industry Same-industry  Full Cross-industry Same-industry  Full Cross-industry Same-industry 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Specialization Level in Target Industry 0.2342* 0.2522** -0.0858         
 (1.8883) (2.4524) (-0.1531)         
Specialization Level in Acquirer Industry     0.1861 0.1254 0.3011     
     (1.2330) (1.1489) (0.8684)     
PC1         0.0075 0.0280** -0.0035 
         (1.3567) (2.4596) (-0.5962) 
Top 8 0.0216** 0.0163*** -0.0078  0.0207 0.0173* 0.0264  0.0099** 0.0177*** -0.0018 
 (2.5218) (3.2440) (-0.1464)  (1.5076) (1.9522) (0.8614)  (2.0748) (3.1144) (-0.3364) 
Top 8 * Pub. Target -0.0050 -0.0069 -0.0049  -0.0051 -0.0089 0.0030  -0.0065 -0.0082 -0.0044 
 (-1.0693) (-1.1610) (-0.6273)  (-1.1957) (-1.4922) (0.2998)  (-1.6111) (-1.4087) (-0.8563) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) -0.0020* -0.0010 -0.0025*  -0.0022* -0.0019 -0.0030  -0.0023** -0.0015 -0.0026** 
 (-1.8220) (-0.7359) (-1.7274)  (-1.9556) (-1.3409) (-1.5298)  (-2.5390) (-1.1097) (-1.9900) 
Tobin's Q -0.0017* -0.0031*** -0.0000  -0.0013 -0.0024** -0.0011  -0.0013 -0.0026*** -0.0002 
 (-1.8533) (-3.2291) (-0.0106)  (-1.5121) (-2.3723) (-0.7349)  (-1.4295) (-2.7498) (-0.1976) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0268** -0.0227 -0.0246  -0.0300** -0.0237* -0.0424  -0.0254** -0.0233 -0.0258 
 (-2.1723) (-1.4507) (-1.0744)  (-2.3814) (-1.6630) (-1.6094)  (-2.1879) (-1.5782) (-1.4126) 
Leverage 0.0318*** 0.0160 0.0125  0.0373** 0.0236 0.0466  0.0241** 0.0215* 0.0165 
 (2.7381) (1.2392) (0.3134)  (2.0805) (1.5818) (1.2912)  (2.4994) (1.6725) (1.2846) 
Run-up -0.0066* -0.0087* -0.0056  -0.0063* -0.0061 -0.0099  -0.0056 -0.0071* -0.0057 
 (-1.7025) (-1.8660) (-0.9890)  (-1.7490) (-1.4640) (-1.2733)  (-1.5811) (-1.6902) (-1.0842) 
Sigma 0.4616*** 0.3105 0.2794  0.4982** 0.3767* 0.6922  0.3330** 0.3657* 0.3447* 
 (2.6776) (1.5937) (0.4461)  (2.3096) (1.6633) (1.5872)  (2.4128) (1.8751) (1.7513) 
Ln (Deal Value) 0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0021  0.0009 -0.0019 0.0067  -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0009 
 (0.5506) (-0.6880) (-0.1887)  (0.4133) (-1.2687) (0.7761)  (-1.0114) (-0.9944) (-0.5265) 
Relative Size 0.0035** 0.0047*** 0.0048  0.0035** 0.0045*** 0.0006  0.0041*** 0.0046*** 0.0042 
 (2.2650) (2.8411) (0.8169)  (2.0801) (2.5841) (0.1266)  (2.8100) (2.6938) (1.5905) 
Tender 0.0045 0.0095 0.0060  0.0074 0.0125* -0.0066  0.0088 0.0114* 0.0039 
 (0.6327) (1.3624) (0.3067)  (1.3937) (1.7046) (-0.4833)  (1.5259) (1.6833) (0.7129) 
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Hostile -0.0181** -0.0228** -0.0120  -0.0202** -0.0258** -0.0083  -0.0186** -0.0249** -0.0119 
 (-2.1197) (-2.1047) (-1.1329)  (-2.1599) (-2.1466) (-0.6939)  (-2.2172) (-2.2396) (-1.1590) 
Relatedness -0.0099    -0.0041    0.0007   
 (-1.3561)    (-0.6228)    (0.2266)   
Pub. Target * All-Cash -0.0105** -0.0115* -0.0078  -0.0102** -0.0099 -0.0075  -0.0091** -0.0106* -0.0075 
 (-2.2931) (-1.9006) (-1.3919)  (-2.0114) (-1.6085) (-1.0433)  (-2.2549) (-1.7662) (-1.5059) 
Pub. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0482*** -0.0457*** -0.0388*  -0.0472*** -0.0426*** -0.0551***  -0.0418*** -0.0442*** -0.0410*** 
 (-8.2077) (-7.6504) (-1.8500)  (-7.4884) (-7.4946) (-3.3042)  (-11.8285) (-8.1921) (-8.5272) 
Priv. Target * All-Cash 0.0012 0.0123* -0.0114*  0.0030 0.0114 -0.0076  0.0008 0.0119 -0.0117** 
 (0.1893) (1.6675) (-1.8770)  (0.3741) (1.4262) (-0.8593)  (0.1236) (1.5868) (-1.9972) 
Priv. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0099 -0.0007 0.0027  -0.0085 -0.0027 -0.0162  -0.0030 -0.0022 -0.0008 
 (-1.5433) (-0.1217) (0.0861)  (-1.1578) (-0.4245) (-0.8621)  (-0.7414) (-0.3693) (-0.1505) 
Sub. Target * All-Cash 0.0032 0.0027 0.0041  0.0033 0.0015 0.0054  0.0030 0.0020 0.0041 
 (0.8528) (0.5208) (0.8366)  (0.8513) (0.2982) (0.8430)  (0.8458) (0.3954) (0.8425) 
Foreign Target 0.0001 -0.0040 -0.0077  0.0005 -0.0018 0.0053  -0.0037 -0.0025 -0.0056 
 (0.0119) (-0.9051) (-0.4012)  (0.1005) (-0.4156) (0.4051)  (-1.1888) (-0.5727) (-1.1905) 
Multiple Bidders 0.0058 0.0092 -0.0062  0.0064 0.0108 -0.0047  0.0065 0.0100 -0.0060 
 (0.6252) (0.8970) (-0.8498)  (0.7091) (1.2072) (-0.5778)  (0.7246) (1.0610) (-0.8824) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0024  -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0037  -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0017 
 (-0.6673) (-0.3839) (-0.3358)  (-0.1581) (-0.4258) (0.6095)  (-1.5239) (-0.3834) (-1.2006) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) 0.0024* 0.0014   0.0017 0.0006   0.0008 0.0009  
 (1.8413) (1.4694)   (1.1750) (0.6127)   (0.9527) (1.0213)  
Intercept 0.0189 0.0202 0.0972  0.0260 0.0502 -0.0359  0.0683*** 0.0492 0.0777*** 
 (0.4588) (0.5215) (0.5757)  (0.6032) (1.4878) (-0.2737)  (3.1877) (1.6309) (2.7291) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
N 6121 2856 3265  6121 2856 3265  6121 2856 3265 
Hansen J Chi2 0.394 0.086 0.015  0.643 0.070 2.599  0.621 0.010 0.095 
p-value 0.530 0.769 0.904  0.423 0.791 0.107  0.431 0.921 0.758 
Instrument Strength Test 8.100 13.607 0.294  11.603 12.898 0.927  130.684 63.749 73.555 
F 7.133*** 4.309*** 6.089***  7.405*** 4.437*** 3.623***  8.845*** 4.549*** 6.212*** 
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Table 7 
Other Measures of Target Information Asymmetry 
This table examines the impact of advisor industry specialization on the acquirer CAR for the sample split based on other 
measures of target information asymmetry for the period 1985-2010. All estimates are taken from the 2SLS regression 
model, with the first-stage results omitted for brevity. The IVs are the same as those used in Table 3. Panel A reports the 
results from the second-stage regression of acquirer CAR on three industry specialization measures (i.e., the industry 
specialist dummy variable; the acquirer advisor’s specialization level in the target’s industry and its specialization level in 
the acquirer’s industry), for the sample split based on whether the target firm has above- or below-mean idiosyncratic 
volatility. The analysis here is restricted to public acquisitions for which the data on target share price are available. Panel B 
repeats the analysis for the sample split based on whether the acquirer has past acquisition experience. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The z-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations.  
Panel A: Target information asymmetry measured by idiosyncratic return volatility  
 Above-mean Volatility  Below-mean Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Industry Specialist (Dummy Variable) 0.0068    0.0011   
 (1.4399)    (0.1198)   
Specialization Level in the Targ. Industry  0.2617**    0.2057  
  (1.9817)    (0.7464)  
Specialization Level in the Acq. Industry   0.2186    -0.0600 
   (1.1768)    (-0.3984) 
Top 8 0.0035 0.0204** 0.0200  0.0029 0.0216 -0.0037 
 (1.1857) (2.3051) (1.2917)  (0.6760) (0.8586) (-0.2166) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) -0.0038*** -0.0034*** -0.0036***  0.0098*** 0.0119*** 0.0090*** 
 (-3.8498) (-2.8472) (-2.9629)  (6.1209) (3.5047) (3.5242) 
Tobin's Q -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0011  -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0016 
 (-1.1353) (-1.6242) (-1.2990)  (-0.7361) (-0.9092) (-0.8142) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0250** -0.0273** -0.0324**  0.0585* 0.0627* 0.0590* 
 (-2.1390) (-2.1749) (-2.4174)  (1.6818) (1.6762) (1.6743) 
Leverage 0.0200** 0.0327** 0.0372*  0.0384** 0.0515* 0.0293 
 (1.9938) (2.5205) (1.8506)  (2.0165) (1.8278) (0.9566) 
Run-up -0.0036 -0.0048 -0.0047  -0.0196** -0.0230** -0.0183* 
 (-0.9490) (-1.1482) (-1.2154)  (-2.1381) (-2.1730) (-1.8382) 
Sigma 0.2743* 0.4667** 0.5067**  0.2022 0.2819 0.0695 
 (1.8647) (2.4818) (2.1146)  (0.6209) (0.7149) (0.1446) 
Ln (Deal Value) -0.0023 0.0016 0.0014  -0.0149*** -0.0142*** -0.0149*** 
 (-1.5295) (0.5556) (0.4995)  (-8.1069) (-5.9708) (-7.9075) 
Relative Size 0.0042** 0.0042** 0.0039**  0.0107*** 0.0058 0.0122*** 
 (2.3758) (2.3214) (2.0247)  (5.1900) (0.8409) (2.9924) 
Tender -0.0003 -0.0059 -0.0033  0.0051 0.0022 0.0056 
 (-0.0565) (-0.9013) (-0.7277)  (0.7492) (0.2543) (0.7950) 
Hostile 0.0039 -0.0121 -0.0062  -0.0006 -0.0058 -0.0006 
 (1.5861) (-1.4068) (-0.6567)  (-0.1395) (-0.6959) (-0.1480) 
Relatedness -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***  -0.0002*** -0.0003** -0.0002** 
 (-7.2336) (-5.6350) (-3.9321)  (-3.7637) (-2.5593) (-2.2916) 
Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0209* -0.0237** -0.0268*  -0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0035 
 (-1.8322) (-1.9917) (-1.8097)  (-0.3184) (-0.2254) (-0.3420) 
Foreign Target -0.0026 0.0036 0.0044  -0.0134 -0.0127 -0.0134 
 (-0.7977) (0.7194) (0.6632)  (-1.1120) (-0.9876) (-1.0760) 
Multiple Bidders 0.0095 0.0070 0.0091  -0.0117 -0.0074 -0.0123 
 (0.8429) (0.5678) (0.7764)  (-1.3646) (-0.7279) (-1.3817) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) -0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0001  -0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0023 
 (-1.6230) (-0.3939) (-0.0596)  (-0.7371) (-0.1834) (-0.7761) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) 0.0010 0.0031** 0.0027  -0.0021 -0.0003 -0.0021 
 (1.2075) (2.2466) (1.4335)  (-1.3523) (-0.0850) (-1.3220) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
N 4982 4982 4982  1139 1139 1139 
Hansen J Chi2 0.356 0.176 0.025  0.086 0.218 1.359 
p-value 0.551 0.675 0.874  0.769 0.640 0.244 
Instrument Strength Test 2321.544 7.345 9.174  355.860 1.810 1.625 
F 4.206*** 3.447*** 3.515***  6.719*** 5.023*** 6.316*** 
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Panel B: Target information asymmetry measured by acquirer past acquisition experience in the target’s industry  
 Without Prior Experience  With Prior Experience 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Industry Specialist (Dummy Variable) 0.0079*    0.0142   
 (1.7219)    (1.3952)   
Specialization Level in the Targ. Industry  0.2168**    -0.2874  
  (1.9616)    (-0.0266)  
Specialization Level in the Acq. Industry   0.1438    -0.3514 
   (1.1174)    (-1.1096) 
Top 8 0.0057 0.0171*** 0.0156  0.0053 -0.0320 -0.0423 
 (1.5506) (2.6811) (1.4481)  (0.8545) (-0.0225) (-0.9623) 
Top 8 * Pub. Target -0.0076* -0.0073 -0.0073  -0.0034 -0.0076 -0.0071 
 (-1.6582) (-1.4745) (-1.5654)  (-0.4505) (-0.0626) (-0.5371) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) -0.0031*** -0.0018 -0.0023*  0.0028 0.0029 0.0019 
 (-3.2776) (-1.4538) (-1.7838)  (1.3911) (0.7903) (0.5389) 
Tobin's Q -0.0024*** -0.0029*** -0.0024***  0.0004 0.0012 0.0013 
 (-3.1898) (-3.5739) (-3.1548)  (0.2635) (0.0421) (0.6397) 
Free Cash Flow -0.0258** -0.0278** -0.0301**  -0.0338 -0.0255 -0.0307 
 (-2.1518) (-2.2179) (-2.3705)  (-1.0373) (-0.0894) (-0.6890) 
Leverage 0.0227** 0.0332*** 0.0369**  0.0060 -0.0188 -0.0325 
 (2.3434) (2.8410) (2.1427)  (0.3143) (-0.0196) (-0.7216) 
Run-up -0.0089** -0.0099** -0.0091**  0.0083 0.0103 0.0158 
 (-2.3645) (-2.4619) (-2.4089)  (0.9379) (0.1304) (1.3499) 
Sigma 0.3450** 0.5050*** 0.4843***  -0.1770 -0.1671 -0.7163 
 (2.4550) (2.9988) (2.6721)  (-0.5506) (-0.1657) (-1.0587) 
Ln (Deal Value) -0.0012 0.0011 0.0002  -0.0050** -0.0108 -0.0142* 
 (-0.8783) (0.5299) (0.1756)  (-2.2916) (-0.0515) (-1.6669) 
Relative Size 0.0042*** 0.0036** 0.0038**  0.0035 0.0036 0.0058 
 (2.9773) (2.4108) (2.5458)  (0.7966) (0.7539) (0.9273) 
Tender 0.0127* 0.0083 0.0117*  -0.0066 0.0025 0.0054 
 (1.9516) (1.1073) (1.8999)  (-0.8634) (0.0103) (0.3133) 
Hostile -0.0224** -0.0227** -0.0230**  -0.0072 -0.0029 0.0356 
 (-2.5649) (-2.5150) (-2.5320)  (-0.3704) (-0.0176) (0.6609) 
Relatedness 0.0051** -0.0052 0.0010  0.0019 0.0138 0.0126 
 (2.1576) (-0.9101) (0.2228)  (0.4036) (0.0299) (0.9726) 
Pub. Target * All-Cash -0.0117*** -0.0128*** -0.0130**  0.0040 0.0060 0.0008 
 (-2.5967) (-2.5835) (-2.4317)  (0.5775) (0.0549) (0.0565) 
Pub. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock -0.0400*** -0.0454*** -0.0444***  -0.0378*** -0.0229 -0.0224 
 (-10.7541) (-8.8764) (-8.4212)  (-4.9910) (-0.0446) (-1.3675) 
Priv. Target * All-Cash 0.0010 0.0018 0.0019  -0.0027 -0.0054 -0.0204 
 (0.1502) (0.2571) (0.2582)  (-0.2932) (-0.0500) (-0.9447) 
Priv. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0004 -0.0057 -0.0028  -0.0011 0.0122 0.0259 
 (0.0865) (-1.0198) (-0.5171)  (-0.1437) (0.0263) (1.0007) 
Sub. Target * All-Cash 0.0056 0.0056 0.0053  -0.0026 -0.0051 -0.0041 
 (1.3990) (1.3220) (1.2858)  (-0.3632) (-0.0732) (-0.3830) 
Foreign Target -0.0055* -0.0039 -0.0038  0.0012 -0.0185 -0.0269 
 (-1.6713) (-1.0484) (-1.0543)  (0.1570) (-0.0266) (-1.0686) 
Multiple Bidders 0.0125 0.0132 0.0144  -0.0146 -0.0127 -0.0026 
 (1.2998) (1.3569) (1.3194)  (-1.3769) (-0.1870) (-0.1392) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) -0.0016* -0.0006 -0.0005  -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0026 
 (-1.7550) (-0.5937) (-0.4001)  (-0.5858) (-0.0819) (-0.4922) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) 0.0007 0.0022** 0.0014  -0.0003 -0.0077 -0.0096 
 (0.9083) (1.9925) (1.2528)  (-0.1441) (-0.0290) (-1.0370) 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
N 4949 4949 4949  1172 1172 1172 
Hansen J Chi2 0.941 1.354 0.138  0.299 0.125 1.012 
p-value 0.332 0.245 0.711  0.585 0.724 0.314 
Instrument Strength Test 2502.087 10.422 16.462  197.174 0.001 1.408 
F 7.832*** 6.758*** 7.138***  3.488*** 2.279*** 1.739*** 
 
65 
 
Table 8 
Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) Regression of Combined CAR 
This table reports the 2SLS regression results of combined CAR on the choice of an industry specialist advisor for the subsamples of 
cross-industry transactions, deals in which target share price has above-average volatility, and deals where acquiring firms have no 
prior acquisition experience in the target’s industry. In each model, the first column estimates the linear probability of an acquirer 
using an industry specialist advisor; whereas the second column presents the results from the second-stage regression of combined 
CAR, measured as the three-day cumulative abnormal returns for the acquirer and the target weighted by their respective market 
capitalization 11 trading days before the announcement date. An acquirer’s choice of an industry specialist advisor is instrumented by 
the average use of industry specialist advisors by the acquirer’s industry and geographic peers. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. The z-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 Cross-industry  Above-mean Volatility  No Prior Experience 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Industry Specialist (Instrumented)  0.0029   0.0125   0.0064 
  (0.3101)   (1.0679)   (0.8363) 
Top 8 0.0484 -0.0018  0.0043 0.0009  0.0470 -0.0020 
 (1.2699) (-0.3394)  (0.0912) (0.1109)  (1.5704) (-0.4275) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) -0.0258 -0.0087***  0.0068 -0.0074**  0.0100 -0.0093*** 
 (-1.4297) (-3.6288)  (0.3374) (-2.4772)  (0.7389) (-5.1835) 
Tobin's Q 0.0093 -0.0035***  0.0118** 0.0001  0.0106 -0.0026** 
 (0.9473) (-3.3712)  (2.2331) (0.0571)  (1.6154) (-2.0641) 
Free Cash Flow -0.1328 0.0099  0.1456 -0.0376  0.0197 0.0014 
 (-1.1366) (0.4345)  (1.0634) (-1.2847)  (0.1621) (0.0632) 
Leverage 0.1620 0.0070  -0.0726 0.0440  0.0027 0.0163 
 (1.2333) (0.3264)  (-0.5331) (1.4277)  (0.0283) (0.9159) 
Run-up -0.0275 -0.0131**  0.0057 -0.0031  -0.0188 -0.0103* 
 (-0.7075) (-2.2789)  (0.2114) (-0.5698)  (-0.6115) (-1.6484) 
Sigma -3.2221* -0.1250  -2.7173** -0.3792  -2.4160** -0.0472 
 (-1.8109) (-0.3861)  (-2.0703) (-1.2276)  (-2.0559) (-0.1822) 
Ln (Deal Value) 0.0102 0.0052*  -0.0149 -0.0045  -0.0122 0.0055*** 
 (0.5341) (1.9255)  (-0.6008) (-1.0468)  (-0.8566) (2.6529) 
Relative Size 0.0108 0.0082*  0.0401 0.0065  0.0388*** 0.0076*** 
 (0.4534) (1.7255)  (1.5995) (1.3040)  (3.8600) (4.7415) 
Tender 0.0348 -0.0007  0.0529 0.0076  -0.0128 0.0034 
 (0.7111) (-0.1066)  (0.8455) (0.7963)  (-0.3185) (0.5741) 
Hostile    -0.0581 0.0183**  -0.0401 0.0070 
    (-1.4106) (2.5607)  (-1.5898) (1.6362) 
Relatedness 0.0012*** -0.0004***  0.0005 -0.0003***  0.0003 -0.0003*** 
 (2.5947) (-6.2557)  (0.8537) (-3.6162)  (0.8242) (-5.9507) 
Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0455 -0.0003  -0.1563 0.0020  0.0227 -0.0008 
 (0.4684) (-0.0279)  (-1.2741) (0.0801)  (0.3399) (-0.0953) 
Foreign Target -0.0171 -0.0188  0.0333 -0.0118  -0.0167 -0.0281** 
 (-0.1536) (-1.1858)  (0.1434) (-0.3691)  (-0.1700) (-2.3721) 
Multiple Bidders -0.0040 -0.0212**  -0.0698 0.0072  -0.0428 -0.0124* 
 (-0.0674) (-2.4256)  (-0.9130) (0.4573)  (-0.8913) (-1.6513) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) -0.0067 -0.0025  -0.0160 0.0011  -0.0035 -0.0013 
 (-0.6144) (-1.2341)  (-0.9249) (0.3263)  (-0.3654) (-0.6570) 
Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) 0.0157 -0.0013  0.0102 0.0009  0.0060 -0.0012 
 (1.4777) (-0.9504)  (0.6486) (0.3762)  (0.6808) (-0.7770) 
Average Use of Specialists  
by Industry Peers 
0.6734***   0.5959***   0.6453***  
 (7.0146)   (4.9116)   (8.8676)  
Average Use of Specialists  
by Geographic Peers 
0.9351***   1.0537***   0.9035***  
 (21.3345)   (17.6943)   (27.6810)  
Industry Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES  
N 6121 677  3265 555  2856 1168 
Hansen J Chi2 - 0.003  - 0.381  - 0.241 
p-value - 0.958  - 0.537  - 0.624 
Instrument Strength Test - 308.129  - 206.485  - 521.519 
F 33.470*** 5.853***  28.406*** 3.366***  58.188*** 7.340*** 
 
 
Table 9 
Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) Regression of Takeover Premium 
This table reports the 2SLS regression results of takeover premium on the choice of an industry specialist advisor for the 
subsamples of cross-industry transactions, deals in which target share price has above-average volatility, and deals where 
acquiring firms have no prior acquisition experience in the target’s industry. Premium is measured by: (1) the price to 
earnings (PE) multiple as reported by SDC for public targets; and (2) a “proxy” premium for unlisted targets, where proxy 
premium is measured as the average PE multiple for a portfolio of listed targets from the same industry and year as the 
unlisted target. In each model, the first column estimates the linear probability of an acquirer using an industry specialist 
advisor; the second column estimates the second-stage regression of premium. An acquirer’s choice of an industry specialist 
advisor instrumented by the average use of industry specialist advisors by the acquirer’s industry and geographic peers. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. The z-statistics statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer 
clustering. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N denotes the number of 
observations. 
 Cross-industry  Above-mean Volatility  No Prior Experience 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Industry Specialist (Instrumented)  -16.6850*   -19.8222***   -11.9604* 
  (-1.8416)   (-2.6007)   (-1.7980) 
Top 8 0.0194 6.1675  0.0021 -2.2209  -0.0012 7.7679 
 (0.5819) (0.8087)  (0.1002) (-0.4610)  (-0.0486) (1.3335) 
Top 8 * Pub. Target -0.0516 -19.9679*     -0.0161 -18.0624** 
 (-1.1771) (-1.9116)     (-0.4668) (-2.2297) 
Ln (Acquirer Size) 0.0078 10.3570***  0.0127 5.6843***  0.0071 6.1197*** 
 (0.7619) (4.4531)  (1.6162) (2.9409)  (0.8962) (3.3491) 
Tobin's Q 0.0057 0.9917  0.0066* 3.2570**  0.0110** 1.2124 
 (1.1298) (0.7532)  (1.6833) (2.2065)  (2.5104) (1.1079) 
Free Cash Flow 0.0929 -14.6256  0.0570 -4.5637  0.0884 -7.9240 
 (0.9191) (-0.7313)  (0.8655) (-0.2649)  (1.3162) (-0.4580) 
Leverage 0.0068 -15.5184  0.0399 -23.4267  0.0801 -53.9773*** 
 (0.0807) (-0.8720)  (0.6162) (-1.5020)  (1.2385) (-4.2758) 
Run-up -0.0108 19.7924**  -0.0133 20.1948***  -0.0180 16.8134** 
 (-0.4748) (2.2429)  (-0.7729) (2.8450)  (-0.9453) (2.5367) 
Sigma 0.4529 278.5961  0.5286 295.7239  0.1971 332.1132* 
 (0.4976) (1.2789)  (0.7729) (1.5589)  (0.2938) (1.7668) 
Ln (Deal Value) -0.0009 -8.1870***  -0.0107 -5.0438**  -0.0039 -5.7885*** 
 (-0.0841) (-3.2043)  (-1.2800) (-2.3310)  (-0.4828) (-2.8372) 
Relative Size 0.0094* 4.4674*  0.0089* 2.1963  0.0107** 2.8338 
 (1.9090) (1.8921)  (1.7261) (0.8721)  (1.9740) (1.1262) 
Tender -0.0815** -22.3925**  -0.0297 -24.6955***  -0.0419 -17.8138** 
 (-2.1709) (-2.1621)  (-0.9567) (-3.1921)  (-1.2632) (-2.1319) 
Hostile 0.0235 -7.8602  -0.0025 -6.6321  0.0239 4.6477 
 (0.3145) (-0.7368)  (-0.0390) (-0.6096)  (0.4182) (0.4953) 
Relatedness    -0.0265 4.8695  -0.0164 5.2022 
    (-1.4370) (1.2599)  (-0.9203) (1.4155) 
Pub. Target * All-Cash -0.0185 11.9255     -0.0139 4.5104 
 (-0.4042) (0.8354)     (-0.3687) (0.4339) 
Pub. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0113 -11.8773     0.0099 -5.5649 
 (0.3381) (-1.3812)     (0.3722) (-0.8911) 
Priv. Target * All-Cash -0.0133 6.6764     -0.0157 10.4655 
 (-0.2363) (0.6191)     (-0.3858) (1.1932) 
Priv. Target * Pmt. incl. Stock 0.0240 -2.5951     0.0512** -2.1914 
 (0.6721) (-0.3083)     (1.9899) (-0.3693) 
Sub. Target * All-Cash -0.0491 0.5748     0.0063 3.7229 
 (-1.1019) (0.0554)     (0.1742) (0.4897) 
Pmt. incl. Stock    0.0002 -0.0520    
    (1.0850) (-1.0573)    
Foreign Target -0.0287 -12.0563  -0.0267 -6.8452  -0.0176 -9.4345 
 (-0.7807) (-1.3706)  (-0.9646) (-1.1667)  (-0.6025) (-1.5798) 
Multiple Bidders 0.0585 11.7472  -0.0438 15.2349  -0.0187 6.3924 
 (1.1805) (0.9117)  (-1.0495) (1.2082)  (-0.4728) (0.8178) 
Ln (Acq. Industry M&A) -0.0086 3.4161*  -0.0048 2.0241  -0.0059 2.0836 
 (-1.2131) (1.7064)  (-0.7250) (1.0469)  (-0.8996) (1.4791) 
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Ln (Targ. Industry M&A) -0.0050 1.9653  -0.0071 2.5992  -0.0046 2.0944 
 (-0.7072) (1.2195)  (-1.0631) (1.5594)  (-0.7248) (1.4789) 
Average Use of Specialists  
by Industry Peers 
0.6779***   0.6416***   0.6434***  
 (9.8175)   (11.8980)   (12.8456)  
Average Use of Specialists  
by Geographic Peers 
0.8910***   0.9464***   0.9230***  
 (29.2118)   (37.1495)   (37.3706)  
Industry Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES   YES   YES  
N 1395 1395  2501 2501  2437 2437 
Hansen J Chi2 - 0.045  - 0.173  - 0.702 
p-value - 0.832  - 0.678  - 0.402 
Instrument Strength Test - 618.526  - 1005.928  - 978.055 
F 52.150*** 4.836***  91.220*** 8.756***  80.066*** 8.561*** 
 
 
 
